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1 INTRODUCTION 
Traditional international law as we know it originated in a closed political 
association among nation states.  As in virtually any association, the participants formed 
and developed the system for themselves, in this case based on the concepts of 
sovereignty equality and consent.  Persons, to the extent recognized, were merely 
appendages of each state.  This paradigm of state sovereignty generally allows states to 
treat people under their jurisdiction as they wish.  International human rights law creates 
a new paradigm, one where people, irrespective of their geographical location, enter the 
equation as rights holders possessing interests that states must recognize.  Where 
interstate rights come from sovereignty, human rights come from dignity. 
The United Nations (UN) was created in 1945 from the rubble of World War II, to 
maintain peace and “reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth 
of the human person.”1  The UN was thus to “achieve international co-operation in […] 
promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for 
all.”2  The Commission on Human Rights (CHR) was established in 1946, as required, under 
the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC),3 and the movement to build a system of 
human rights law, through development of norms, duties and practices, started in 
earnest.  American representative John Foster Dulles called the CHR the “soul” of the 
Charter.4
In the interstate system, each state has its own self-interest and level of 
development.  All understand, however, that human rights may fundamentally conflict 
with sovereignty rights.  The UN, a state created institution, allows retention of ultimate 
 
                                                     
1 UN Charter, Preamble. 
2 Id., Art. 1.3 
3 Id., Art. 68. 
4 Boyle (2009) p. 21, fn. 60.  
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state power, except in rare circumstances, in Article 2.7 of the UN Charter.  It says, in 
effect, maintenance of international peace and security, under Chapter VII, is the only 
reason the UN may intervene in matters essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any 
state.  There may be no stronger principle in the UN than non-intervention, even if 
individuals are the ultimate beneficiaries of the UN and states themselves. 
 The human rights movement, grounded in dignity and personal autonomy,5 had no 
option besides development within the state sovereignty paradigm that, by nature, saw it 
as a potential threat.  That was the existing template.  Finding constructive balance in the 
tension between the paradigms is perhaps the main characteristic affecting human rights 
law in the UN and internationally.  Into this picture enters the Universal Periodic Review 
(UPR), to some the most tangible innovation in the reform process that created the 
Human Rights Council (HRC) in 2006, replacing the repudiated CHR.6
 The UPR’s function is to assess each state’s fulfillment of its human rights 
obligations and commitments, based on objective and reliable information, in a manner 
that ensures universality of coverage and equal treatment with respect to all states.
 
 7
 The UPR is a political process where states police themselves, in contrast to the 
quasi-legal character of the treaty bodies and special procedures.  It was predictable that 
protection of state interests would predominate institution building of the UPR.  With 
strong support from states that emphasize Article 2.7 to shield domestic matters from 
  It is 
to be cooperative, interactive, and fully involve the state under review (SUR), considering 
its capacity building needs.  It should also complement, not duplicate, the work of treaty 
bodies.  The HRC was otherwise responsible to develop the modalities of the new 
mechanism. 
                                                     
5 Personal autonomy, used in the thesis, is associated to rights indispensable for dignity and free 
development of one’s political, economic, social and cultural personality, without outside interference.  
Conceptually, it possesses the same nature as the self-determination that states, acting as fictitious persons, 
claim between themselves, but on the individual, micro level.  CERD General Comment 21, para. 5, identifies 
this link to the exercise of such rights by every person.  
6 See Abede (2009) p.5. 
7 A/RES/60/251 (2006) para 5(e). 
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scrutiny,8 the UPR is not empowered to take specific measures regarding implementation 
or noncompliance, but appears more like a venue to encourage implementation.9
 The first UPR session was held in April 2008.  The process is in evolution.  The 
initial cycle to review all states will not be completed until 2012.  The HRC itself is to be re-
evaluated in 2011 to perhaps elevate human rights alongside peace and security and 
development as the pillars of the UN structure.
  It relies 
on a state report as its starting point.  Outcomes are predicated on consent of the State 
under Review (SUR).  The mechanism, extremely abbreviated and inefficient, permits 
selectivity and is subject to abuse.  A skeptic could see the UPR as merely illusory to create 
the impression of international concern while affording inadequate means to obtain 
compliance. 
10  Many issues will confront the UPR and 
its future direction.  Can this political body achieve integrity and legitimacy?  Can it 
improve trust in the face of diverse interests and cultures?  Can it effectively balance 
between the interests of states and individuals to create realistic outcomes that make a 
difference on the ground?11  Answers will reveal themselves in time.  More immediate 
questions go to the UPR’s procedure and ability to produce the “objective and reliable 
information” as the basis for its outcomes.12
 The research question considered is to determine how state obligations may serve 
to influence the UPR mechanism on a practical, progressive level to enhance human rights 
and interests.  Undoubtedly, it cannot address all aspects of the UPR process.  Though 
only an infant, the subject matter is large.
  These include matters discussed below in 
the thesis such as openness, inclusion and efficiency, norms of obligations, effect of state 
conduct and the role of equity, meaning of “cooperation,” and complementarity. 
13
                                                     
8 Some of these states formerly maintained that Article 2.7 should not preclude intervention. 
  And since the UPR has not completed a cycle, 
9 Abede (2009) p. 31. 
10 A/RES/60/251 (2006) para. 16. 
11 A/HRC/5/1 (2007) para. 4(a). 
12 A/RES/60/251 (2006) para. 5(e). 
13 This thesis significantly relies on several sources with greater proximity to daily events in Geneva for 
examples regarding issues during institution building and proceedings of the UPR.  These include ISHR 
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and is subject to review after the initial cycle,14
 The thesis uses a qualitative approach that integrates legal, political and historical 
perspectives, as each affects both human rights and international law.  Chapter 2 looks at 
the background of human rights at the UN leading to the UPR’s creation.  Chapter 3 
describes the UPR mechanism and procedure, and discusses some significant contextual 
politico-legal issues encountered in the institution building process.  In Chapter 4, there is 
an examination of legal sources of state obligations in human rights applicable in the UPR, 
including the manner these obligations develop.  Then, Chapter 5 identifies, in the context 
of continuing issues of dispute between members at the HRC and UN, generally, core 
categories of interests from these legal obligations by which the UPR mechanism, and the 
performance of all states within, may be analyzed.  In Chapter 6, impressions on the 
mechanism and potential for improvement are provided, based primarily on the criteria 
established and information analyzed. 
 it seems unrealistic to make firm 
conclusions about worth, as compared to understanding patterns of interplay between 
different actors and interests.  There is merit, however, to examine the development of 
human rights law and state obligations to ascertain categories of interests for state 
responsibilities which, when observed, can influence and improve state conduct in the 
UPR process and, on a larger level, its domestic processes.  In the course of writing, 
emphasis was made to see the UPR in its current state, not forgetting the dynamic aspect 
of its evolution in the glare of UN politics.   
 A recent examination found the UPR was already overwhelmingly political and did 
not provide for experts or civil society to adequately participate.15  Rather, states provide 
the primary information, engage in the interactive dialogue, and consolidate the report 
itself.16
                                                                                                                                                                 
(2009) pp. 37-50 and (2010) pp. 33-41; Sweeney (2009) pp. 203-223; Abede (2009) pp. 1-35; and Abraham 
(2007) pp. 234-241. 
  Alhough the UPR is, to date, much less effective than it could have been in terms 
14 Id., para. 14, fn a. 
15 See UN Watch (2009). 
16 Abedi (2009) p. 8. 
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of participation, and still subject to abuse and manipulation in the political power struggle 
inherent at the UN, it nevertheless contains promising opportunities for moving human 
rights forward that did not previously exist.  
Ultimately, the UPR will only be as good as the states that use it.  When states 
adopt and utilize good practices to develop the mechanism as a legitimate means to help 
states move purposefully toward fulfillment of their national and and international human 
rights obligations and responsibilities, rather than a shield against scrutiny into matters of 
domestic jurisdiction, other states may act similarly.  In such case, the UPR process can 
become a true forum for deliberation and discourse that furthers commitments, 
assistance, and implementation of the rights set forth in the UDHR for those on the 
ground and their progeny. 
2 HUMAN RIGHTS AT THE UN AND THE UPR    
2.1 THE COMMISSION AND UDHR:  A SOVEREIGN WORLD TRANSFORMED 
 The UN was an effort by mostly powerful states to maintain international peace 
and security using an intergovernmental mechanism, while recognizing human rights and 
development were indispensible.  Boyle says the original idea was to address human 
rights issues at the level of principle, but deny victims redress that might offend the 
principle of state sovereignty.17  Thus, Article 68 mandated the Economic and Social 
Council (ECOSOC) to set up a commission “for the promotion of human rights,” but the 
most powerful states inserted Article 2.7, in part, to allay concerns over interventions in 
their internal human rights policies.18
                                                     
17 Boyle (2009) pp. 15-16. 
 
18 Ibid.  Also Lauren (2007) pp. 312-313.   
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A “nuclear” Commission was formed,19 headed by Eleanor Roosevelt, and 
convened in February 1946 to consider the new CHR and its mandate.  Of all obstacles, 
they and others saw sovereignty as most problematic.20  A US diplomat once explained, 
“The essence of sovereignty is the absence of responsibility.”21  Herbert Evatt, foreign 
minister of Australia, remarked, “Every country represented … has its own internal 
problems, its own vital spheres of domestic policy in which it cannot, without forfeiting its 
very existence as a state, permit external intervention.”22
The nuclear Commission wanted the CHR be an agency of implementation 
entrusted to watch over general “observance of human rights.”
  Sovereignty allowed national 
leaders to declare immunity from international efforts regarding the responsibility for 
internal human rights violations.  This illustrates the environment that human rights law 
would enter.  Interestingly, the UPR faces much the same issues.  
23  Concerning 
membership, it generally believed, as ECOSOC members were elected by and represented 
governments, the CHR, appointed by ECOSOC, should consist of highly qualified persons 
to serve as non-governmental representatives.24  With experts, the CHR would have 
greater independence and integrity to challenge governments and actively serve to 
protect victims of human rights abuses.  Seen by states as too ambitious, threatening to 
sovereignty and domestic jurisdiction, the nuclear proposal was decisively rejected by 
ECOSOC.25
                                                     
19 See Lempinen (2010) p. 6. 
  The CHR would be an intergovernmental organization for discussion, not 
enforcement. 
20 Lauren (2007) p. 311. 
21 Former Secretary of State Robert Lansing.  See Lauren (2007) p. 311, fn. 17. 
22Lauren (2007) p. 313. 
23 Gutter (2006) p. 41, fn. 93. 
24 Report of the Commission (1946), E/38 (21 June 1946) pp. 230–231.  See Alston (2006) p. 189.  The 
Soviets demanded that all members of the CHR and Sub-Commissions be government representatives.  See 
Lauren (2006) p. 314. 
25 ESC Res 9 (II), UN ESCOR, 2nd sess, Annex 14, UN Doc E/RES/9 (II) (21 June 1946).  See Alston (2006) p. 
190. 
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Philip Alston believes an opportunity was missed by the nuclear Commission to 
specify why it supported independent experts.26  It was unrealistic to expect 
governmental representatives to be critical of their states, and generally they possessed 
insufficient technical knowledge to address the complexity of issues.  ECOSOC could have 
reserved real decision-making authority and used an expert CHR to generate ideas, 
facilitate multiple interests.27  Lacking independent experts as members, however, the 
states condemned themselves to debates over membership that helped in the CHR’s 
demise.28  Experts on the CHR would have also precluded what occurred, membership by 
governments thought responsible for grave violations, and likely helped the CHR from 
becoming “governmentalised.”29
Politics also forced the CHR early on to make “a critical declaration of 
impotence”
 
30 when it came to individual violations and petitions.31  Resistance came from 
the major powers like the US, USSR, and UK.32  If individuals could circumvent their 
governments to seek redress from the international community, it could challenge the 
primacy of national sovereignty and increase risks of outside interference into states’ 
internal affairs, at home or in colonies.  Thus, the CHR “recognized” that it had “no power 
to take any action with regard to any complaints concerning human rights.”33  In Tolley’s 
words, “The Commission thus repudiated its powers to investigate and to make 
recommendations, beginning a twenty year period of self-denial.”34
Tasked with responsibility to draft an “international bill of rights,” the CHR set to 
develop a legal framework of norms.  Once evident, however, that binding obligations or 
 
                                                     
26 Alston (2006) pp. 189-190.  
27 Ibid.  
28 Id., p. 190.   
29 Ibid.  Also Lempinen (2005) pp. 13-18. 
30 Tolley (1987) p. 16. 
31 Id., pp. 16-17. Also Lauren (2007) at pp. 314-315 and Gutter (2007) p. 96. 
32 Tolley (1987) p. 17.  Also Boyle (2009) p. 24.   
33 Commission on Human Rights Report of the First Session, E/259 (1947); and ECOSOC Res. 75(V), 5 August 
1947.  
34 Tolley (1987) p. 17. 
 8 
enforcement measures might result, powerful states mounted serious resistance.  The 
Soviets warned of crossing the border between international and internal law that divides 
the inter-relationships of governments, while the US sought to focus on the “safer 
ground” of an unenforceable declaration of principles that did not “involve any [legal] 
commitments by this Government.”35
The UN adopted the UDHR on 10 December 1948.
 
36  The list of rights were not, 
according to Eide, universal in terms of recognition, enforcement or enjoyment, but a 
future-oriented project to be pursued by deliberate action by committed actors, to push 
and to persuade where they could, “... by teaching and education to promote respect for 
these rights and freedoms and by progressive measures to secure their universal 
recognition and observance.”37  This involves efforts, as seen in Section 4.1.3. to respect, 
protect and fulfill.  However, until absorbed into positive, national law and/or made 
justiciable in the practice of courts, human rights could not be considered “law.”38
 The UDHR has been called the magna carta for mankind.
 
39  Some claim it has legal 
force.40  It served as the foundation of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR) and International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR), hereafter (Covenants)41
                                                     
35 Lauren (2007) p. 316, fns. 32-33. 
 and inspired a revolution in human rights, 
internationally, regionally, and at the domestic level.  John Humphreys, who participated 
in the early proceedings, noted that creating global protection for human rights 
“represents a radical departure from traditional thinking and practice….  We are in effect 
asking States to submit to international supervision their relationship with their own 
citizens, something which has been traditionally regarded as an absolute prerogative of 
36 G.A. Res. 217, 3 GAOR UN Doc at 71 (10 December 1948). 
37 Eide (2007) pp. 139-140. 
38 Id., p. 140.  
39 UN Watch (2008) p. 1. 
40 See Section 3.3. 
41 A/RES/2200 (XXI) (16 December 1966) pp. 49-60.  The UDHR, Covenants, and the ICCPR Optional Protocol 
make up the International Bill of Human Rights.  
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national sovereignty.”42
2.2 A PREDECESSOR TO THE UPR?  
  But as matters on the ground developed and UN membership 
changed, the national sovereignty prerogative would come under increasing attack.  
 As early as 1950, France proposed a periodic reporting system tied to the UDHR.43  
The US was instrumental in a 1956 system of country self-reporting on human rights.44  
The American proposal called for submission of voluntarily reports to address “results 
achieved and difficulties encountered … in the promotion and development of human 
rights.” 45  After summary and analysis by the Secretary-General and specialized agencies, 
using information from their members and appropriate comments, a committee of 
member states would conduct a review.46
 Alston points to three significant decisions related to the 1956 self-reporting 
mechanism that affect UN reporting procedures thereafter.
  The voluntary process was underutilized and 
abolished in 1980.  And during this time, since the CHR only focused on normative matters 
of treaty development, scrutiny of states’ compliance with international human rights 
norms was virtually nonexistent. 
47  First, the CHR decided to 
seek information only on “general developments and progress achieved” instead of 
“results achieved and difficulties encountered” as originally proposed in the draft.  
Although the Covenants adopted the more expansive approach, state reports downplay 
or ignore difficulties.48
                                                     
42 Lauren (2007) p. 319.  
 
43 Alston (2006) p. 207, fn. 112. 
44 ECOSOC Res. 624B (XXII) (1 August 1956).  See Alston (1992) pp. 132-133 and (2006) pp. 207-208 about 
the 1953 Bricker Amendment and subsequent US action program. 
45 United States of America: Revised Draft Resolution on Annual Reports in Report of the Ninth Session of 
the Commission on Human Rights (1953) p. 32, para. 263. See also Alston (2006) p. 208, fn. 117. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Alston (2006) pp. 211-212. 
48 Id., at p. 211. 
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 Second, without dissent from any CHR member, a change was made whereby the 
Secretary-General would only prepare a “brief summary” of the report, not “a brief 
summary and analysis.”  Alston continues: 
Few decisions by the Commission have been as conscientiously adhered to 
as this one has been. Even 50 years later, not a single UN human rights 
reporting system provides for the Secretariat to undertake a detailed 
technical analysis of states’ reports prior to their consideration by the 
relevant political or expert body concerned — a practice long followed by 
the ILO and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization (‘UNESCO’).49
 Third, with regard to “comments and conclusions … it deems appropriate,” the 
final version added “recommendations,” but only if they were “of an objective and 
general” nature.  In other words, not country specific and/or dealing with particular 
situations.
 
50
 After the reporting system was abandoned, the Secretary-General described it as 
“obsolete, ineffective or of marginal usefulness.”
  These limitations, inherited by all UN reporting procedures, influenced 
institution building in the HRC, and continue to do so in the UPR. 
51  Alston nonetheless saw important 
precedent.  It showed the UN had moved substantially from the position that the UDHR 
was not legally binding, that state conduct could not be subject to formal review, and that 
a reporting procedure would not interfere with domestic affairs of states.52  Lack of 
success, however, was not surprising.  Although the UN Charter called for states, through 
joint and separate action and cooperation, to promote human rights,53
2.3 EXPANDING INTO VIOLATIONS   
 intergovernmental 
forces of state sovereignty remained the frame of reference. 
 By 1966, when the Covenants were adopted, the UN had changed significantly due 
to new membership and effects from colonialism.  Conflict was also shifting from 
                                                     
49 Id., at p. 212. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Gaer (2007) p. 116. 
52 Alston (2006) pp. 208-209.  
53 UN Charter, Articles 1.3, 55 and 56. 
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international to internal.  Conditions on the ground caused the status quo to shift.  Space 
does not afford ample opportunity to discussion how the CHR engaged human rights 
violations, but one may note that new, independent, developing countries first acted to 
diminish the sovereignty principle of Article 2.7, in relation to apartheid in South Africa.  
Under Resolution 1235,54 ECOSOC authorized the CHR to publically examine information 
about “gross violations” of human rights and fundamental freedoms from “situations” 
that revealed a consistent pattern.55
 The 1235 procedure permitted scrutiny “in all countries,”
 
56 squarely rejecting the 
safe haven of nonintervention formerly instilled by the major powers.  The CHR was 
enabled to respond to country-specific and thematic situations in a framework that 
became known as “special procedures.”57  In 1975, after the Pinochet coup, Chile became 
the first state scrutinized solely on the basis of human rights.  Special procedures 
permitted the UN, through the CHR, to assert itself beyond the level of principle.  It was 
recognition, according to Boyle, of an underlying obligation not to violate human rights, to 
cooperate and act in efforts to address and enhance them.58
 ECOSOC Resolution 1503
 
59 in 1970 authorized CHR review of individual, 
confidential communications that appeared to reveal a consistent pattern of gross and 
reliably attested violations, but only with express consent and constant co-operation with 
the state concerned under conditions determined by agreement.60
                                                     
54 ECOSOC Res. 1235 (XLII) (6 June 1967).  
  Notwithstanding, 
through diplomatic measures, powerful, mostly developed states, where problems of 
55 Id., at paras. 1, 2 and 3.  See also Gutter (2007) p. 97.  
56 See para 1. 
57 Yeboah (2008) p. 79. 
58 Boyle (2009) p. 16. 
59 ECOSOC Res. 1503(XLVIII) (27 May 1970). 
60 Id., para. 6(b).  Addition restrictions were imposed, such as the exhaustion of domestic remedies and 
exclusivity of the matter before the Committee. 
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inequality and discrimination often remained,61
 Conversely, developing states, where internal conflict and violations were more 
likely, became vulnerable as targets.  Some that initially supported the rationale behind 
special procedures resisted when eyes turned to their internal power struggles, calling for 
tolerance and non-confrontation, often along North-South lines.
 successfully avoided meaningful action 
against them or their allies. 
62  Equatorial Guinea was 
the first escalation from the 1503 communication process to the public scrutiny of 1235, 
purely in a human rights context, and when Argentina flagrantly abused the 
confidentiality rule of 1503, it set in motion a process to create, in 1980, the first “theme” 
under the Working Group on Disappearances.63
 Special procedures provided deterrent value to compel state compliance or be 
placed in a position of having to defend its record.  It helped create balance and a larger 
voice for dignity interests before the CHR.  No longer could sovereignty automatically 
render states immune or unaccountable.  Despite the failings that followed, the CHR, 
according to Lauren, was the premier political forum to confront governments over 
reports of serious violations, to name and shame them, and to draw attention to the need 
for corrective action to stand up and protect victims of human rights abuses.
 
64
2.4 BREAKDOWN, REFORM AND THE UPR 
 
 A new political majority from Asia and Africa emerged in the UN, influencing 
almost every activity, and regional groups and political caucuses, such as the Non-Aligned 
Movement (NAM), took a greater role.65
                                                     
61 A clear example was the US and its racial problems.  
  Internal self-determination and racial 
discrimination could justify intrusion into a state’s domestic affairs.  Assisted by experts 
62 See Scheipers (2007) pp. 232-237.   
63 Gutter (2006) pp. 68-69. 
64 Lauren (2007) p. 325. 
65 Boyle (2009) p. 26. 
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on the Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, special 
procedures mandates grew rapidly starting in the 1990s.66
 When the procedures focused to a large degree on developing states, the 
importance of the CHR was cause for authoritarian regimes to campaign within their 
respective regional blocs to seek membership.
 
67  Members sat as both judges and 
defendants.68  Because the UN Charter was ambiguous, giving ammunition to all sides, 
states could use sovereignty as a shield to obscure human rights records.  Abusers could 
hide behind the same veil the most powerful once created to preserve their political 
prerogatives.  States engaged in bloc voting, quashed discussion, and resisted country 
specific mandates as an infringement.  As Buhrer evidenced for Reporters Without 
Borders, almost all members engaged in double standards and poor conduct, looking at 
others while ignoring themselves or their friends, revealing the continued dominance of 
politics.69
In December 2004, it was acknowledged that some states sought membership 
"not to strengthen human rights but to protect themselves against criticism or to criticize 
others"
  The CHR became a breeding ground for disputes over membership, procedures 
and “politicization” that, inter alia, grew to finally destroy it as an effective body.   
70 and a new body was recommended.  Kofi Annan agreed “the Commission's 
declining credibility has cast a shadow on the reputation of the United Nations system as 
a whole.”71  An HRC would be “a fresh start. . . .Its main task would be to evaluate the 
fulfilment by all states of all their human rights obligations.”72
                                                     
66 From 1990-1994, 7 new thematic procedures and 11 country-specific procedures were created. The Cold 
War effect also ended. See Gutter (2007) pp. 102-103. 
  This would help elevate 
67 Lauren (2007) p. 322. 
68 Id., p. 327. 
69 See Buhrer (2003).  
70 Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Changes. A/59/565 (2004). 
71 Report of the Secretary-General. In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for 
all. A/59/2005 (2005). 
72 Ibid. 
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human rights to primacy with security and development at the UN, as they are 
interconnected and cannot be enjoyed unless human rights are respected.73
The World Summit outcome in September 2005 resolved to create the HRC to 
address situations of violations of human rights, including gross and systematic violations, 
among other things.
 
74  Details were deferred to the General Assembly where, on 15 
March 2006, Resolution 60/251 was adopted, creating the HRC and the UPR therein.75
3 THE UPR AS A MECHANISM 
 
 The UPR grew from the need to bring a sense of order back to UN human rights 
process, and promote enhanced dialogue and broadened understanding among 
civilizations, cultures and religions while recognizing the importance of universality, 
objectivity and non-selectivity in the consideration of human rights issues and elimination 
of double standards and politicization.76  The UPR looks to the SUR’s fulfillment of its 
human rights obligations and commitments and ensure universality of coverage and equal 
treatment, be cooperative, and complement, not duplicate, the work of treaty bodies.77
3.1 UPR NUTS & BOLTS 
 
 Unlike the CHR that reported to ECOSOC, the HRC reports to the General 
Assembly.  Membership remains geographically constituted between the five regional 
groups, reduced from 53 to 47, but there is less balance than before.78
                                                     
73 Id. at para 17.  See also Boyle (2009) p. 20. 
   
74 World Summit Outcome. A/RES/60/1 (2005) paras. 157-159. 
75 A/RES/60/251 (2006) para. 5(e). 
76 Ibid. 
77 Ibid. 
78 Abraham (2007) p. 6.  The Western and Latin American groups lost six seats.  The High Level Panel had 
suggested universal membership.  See A/59/565 (2004) para. 285.     
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Elections to the HRC are by majority of the General Assembly, not the rubber stamp 
process of ECOSOC.  Candidate contributions, voluntary pledges and commitments are 
factors to be taken into account in the voting.  Such voluntary undertakings, discussed in 
Section 4.3, arguably constitute binding obligations, for the record, and create the 
inference of intent to comply that places the burden on the state to offer explanation 
when an issue of noncompliance may rise.  Pledges can be a particular focus when a 
member’s UPR occurs, and the subject matter a basis for recommendations and follow up. 
 HRC Resolution 5/179
 Information for the WG comes from three primary sources.  The SUR sets the table 
with a report of its choice, not longer than 20 pages.
 sets forth the essential framework of the UPR mechanism 
developed from the institution building process prescribed by the General Assembly.  The 
UPR will cover all UN states each four years.  The main review is carried out by a UPR 
Working Group (WG) of all 47 HRC members in an interactive dialogue.  The WG prepares 
a report, including recommendations, then considered in the HRC Plenary, and a final 
outcome is adopted. 
80  General guidelines81 suggest 
references to obligations in the basis of the review and their implementation, 
identification of achievements, best practices, challenges and constraints, and description 
of the consultation process and methodology used at the national level.  However, 
reporting obligations should not be burdensome.  Nor is it required to address pledges 
from a member’s candidacy for membership.  The OHCHR produces the two other 
sources, a summary of information from treaty bodies, special procedures and other 
relevant official UN documents, not exceeding 10 pages; and a summary of credible and 
reliable information provided by relevant stakeholders like NGOs, national HRs 
institutions, and HRs defenders, not exceeding 10 pages.82
                                                     
79 A/HRC/5/1 (18 June 2007). 
 
80 Id., para 15.   
81 A/HRC/DEC/6/102 (27 September 2007). 
82 A/HRC/5/1 (2007) para 15.    
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 The UPR process is facilitated by a “troika” composed of three rapporteurs, 
randomly appointed by the HRC.  With support from the OHCHR, it prepares the WG to 
hold the interactive dialogue, lasting only three (3) hours, including presentation by the 
SUR, comments, questions and recommendations from other states, and replies.  States 
have no obligation to respond to questions put to them during examination.83  Here, 
other relevant stakeholders may only observe.  In conjunction with the SUR, the troika 
completes the WG report.  The SUR is expected to examine all recommendations and 
identify those that enjoy its support.84
 The HRC Plenary is 60 minutes.  Other relevant stakeholders may now directly 
participate with “general comments,” an area of controversy discussed in Sections 3.5 and 
5.3.2.  The mechanism ends with adoption by the HRC of an outcome document that 
contains, inter alia, recommendations for implementation by the SUR and, as appropriate, 
other stakeholders.
  Other recommendations are noted in the WG 
report, even those rejected, along with SUR comments. 
85  The SUR, and others, are expected to follow up on the 
recommendations that enjoy its support as well as on voluntary commitments and 
pledges.86
3.2 BUILDING THE UPR 
  The nature of subsequent reviews and follow-up, if any, remains unknown. 
 To assist in creation of the UPR, Ambassador Mohammed Loulichki of Morocco 
was appointed to facilitate an intersessional, intergovernmental working group.87
                                                     
83 In comparison, neglecting a treaty body's questions may result in more pointed concluding observations, 
but UPR recommendations, already made, leaves no incentive to answer and affect the outcome.  See 
Sweeney (2009) p. 211. 
  
Predictably, states with most affection for Article 2.7, numerically superior, successfully 
worked to take control over the process, using old paradigm calls for “consensus” and 
84 A/HCR/PRST/8/1 (2008), para. 10. 
85 A/HRC/5/1 (2007) para 33.  See Callejon (2008) p. 334-335. 
86 A/HCR/PRST/8/1 (2008), para. 10. 
87 A/HRC/DEC/1/103 (2006). 
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“cooperation” that work to restrict effective scrutiny of conduct, transparency and 
participation, that states wanting a more humanized approach could not offset.88
 Despite looking at the procedures of existing mechanisms for periodic review,
 
89 
consensus developed that the SUR would supply a report and presentation as a starting 
point of interaction.  Alston questioned the overall benefit of a review process that 
depends on an initial state report, a 1950’s relic used by treaty bodies because they so 
require, yet rejected in most other areas of international monitoring where the starting 
point is not information by the actor being monitored.90  In an instance of déjà vu,91 
“analysis” is barred from OHCHR compilations.92  Participation of non-state actors, such as 
experts and civil society, was also limited, particularly compared to their roles at the 
CHR.93
 The core of the facilitator’s non-paper of 27 April 2007
 
94 became the final 
institution-building text, Resolution 5/1, but the institution building phase did not resolve 
important issues.95  Days before the first WG hearing, Egypt/African Group, 
Palestine/Arab Group, and Pakistan/Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) raised 
concerns in a non-paper over matters like webcasting, publishing on the internet, and 
format of the WG report.96  On the morning of the first session, the President presented a 
final statement on modalities and practices97
                                                     
88 See Gaer (2007) pp. 128-133. 
 that did not solve everything, but formed a 
basis to proceed, and permitted webcasting, a huge step for transparency in the 
89 A/HRC/DEC/1/103 (2006) para. 5. 
90  Alston (2006) p. 214. 
91 See Section 2.2, above. 
92 Abraham (2007) p. 38.    
93 See Lempinen (2010) pp. 26-27. 
94 See Loulichki (2007).  
95 Perhaps facilitation was largely uncontentious because the UPR was seen as key to recovery of the CHR’s 
lost credibility. See Sweeney (2009) p. 205. 
96 Late submission led some to question the ‘transparency’ and intentions of the sponsors. ISHR (2009) p. 
38. 
97 A/HCR/PRST/8/1 (2008).   
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intergovernmental process.  To open a window into the UPR and interests that push it in 
different directions, some issues presented in building the UPR are discussed below.  
3.3 NATURE AND BASIS OF THE REVIEW 
 Secretary-General Annan originally proposed that the HRC would undertake a 
“peer review” of all states, but “periodic” was adopted by the general Assembly.98
 The control issue is further evident in matters of participation.  Resolution 5/1 calls 
on the UPR to ensure participation of all relevant stakeholders.
  The 
mechanism is each.  A broader issue is how to keep it from becoming occasional and 
irrelevant, or worse, where genuine human rights dialogue is replaced by theater that 
hinders progress.  States are mostly free to be heard, but not obliged to hear, respond to 
questions or consent to any recommendations.  The UPR mechanism should be 
cooperative, based fulfillment of obligations, not a means to criticize failure to do so.  
Without sufficient trust in the system, however, states keep firm control, illustrated by 
the reporting system adopted, that most other areas of international monitoring reject. 
99  Looking again to the 
CHR periodic review, Alston advocated a major role in the UPR for OHCHR and experts, as 
this would help improve the recommendation system and build credibility in the new 
political process.100
 An ongoing matter concerns which human rights obligations and commitments are 
included in the scope of the review, and the variation of treatment between states with 
  States decided otherwise, to keep the UPR solely intergovernmental, 
use a neutered troika approach, and allow less direct participation from experts and civil 
society.  Nonetheless, the UPR mandate is wide, with opportunities for states to use best 
practices and exercise political will.  It provides a focus point for issues and sources of 
information to gather in the public domain and, perhaps, will assist other human rights 
mechanisms. 
                                                     
98 A/59/2005 (2005) Add.1, para. 6. 
99 A/HRC/5/1. (2007), paras. 3(m) and 4(f).  
100 Alston (2006) p. 214. 
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different obligations.101  Consistent with the Article 2.7, some wanted to exclude 
examination about treaties not ratified.  Singapore said that since states “are neither 
obligated to fulfil […] nor have made a commitment to do so […] the review should 
examine broader obligations under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as well as 
commitments made by individual States, such as the voluntary pledges made while 
seeking membership.”102  Gaer sees irony when states want no scrutiny over unratified 
treaties, yet favor examination on the full range of issues in the UDHR that appears to 
overlap the treaties and is broader in application.103
 Resolution 5/1 provides that the basis of the UPR review is the UN Charter, the 
UDHR, human rights instruments to which the SUR is party, and voluntary pledges and 
commitments, including those undertaken when presenting candidatures for election to 
the HRC.  The review shall also take into account applicable international humanitarian 
law, which, since many violations result from internal conflict, may have a significant 
effect future UPRs, especially vis-à-vis development from customary law. 
   
 A right need not be justiciable or treaty based to be the subject of inquiry, even if 
states disagree.  For example, on the issue of sexual orientation, Egypt claimed a matter 
could only be within the basis of review if a state had made a voluntary pledge and 
commitment.104  When the issue resurfaced, Egypt objected to “certain states imposing 
controversial subjects on others.”105
                                                     
101 See Gaer (2007) pp. 125-126. 
  Such allegations, to be understood, may require 
clarification on the record, in relation to the right to be protected.  This would increase 
transparency and communication about differing values regarding issues of current 
concern.  Narrow confines of scrutiny decrease chances for productive discourse, 
understanding and consensus. 
102 Ibid. 
103 Id., p.126.   
104 ISHR (2009) p. 41. 
105 Gamaleldin statement, UPR WG for Botswana, 1 Dec. 2008.   
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3.4 RECOMMENDATIONS 
 Recommendations go to compliance and follow up.  According to Resolution 5/1, 
recommendations shall be included in the outcome report.106  Implementation, however, 
can be problematic if states cannot agree on what is a recommendation.  Some SURs have 
challenged that content of recommendations must be within the “framework of 
universally recognised human rights.”107  The WG decided it does not endorse 
recommendations, but factually reflects what occurs during the interactive dialogue.108
 Although a formal WG recommendation, compared a state recommendation, 
would carry more institutional weight, recommendations are probably unenforceable.  
Also, if WG approval was required, negotiations to reach consensus might water down 
recommendations or produce nothing.  Now there is an avenue to inject detailed, specific 
recommendations in controversial areas into the sunlight, venturing as far as a state is 
willing to act, to open scrutiny at the next UPR.
  
Thus, all recommendations from individual states, even if rejected, are in the outcome 
report.   
109
 Differences about what constitutes international human rights law and obligations, 
for purposes of recommendations, will continue.  Civil society and stakeholders may 
influence these issues by a variety of means, particularly suggesting recommendations for 
utilization, based on their specialized knowledge of situations, and sharing information to 
assist states and other stakeholders at the domestic and international levels, among other 
things. 
 
                                                     
106 Para. 32. 
107 Pakistan. See ISHR (2008) p. 45.  Resolved by Pakistan offering its opinion of what it considered to be 
fact, rather than make the factual conclusion itself. 
108 A/HCR/PRST/8/1 (2008) para. 8. 
109 A/HRC/5/1 (2007) para. 34. 
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3.5 OUTCOME AND FOLLOW-UP  
 The Plenary for adoption of the WG report lasts 60 minutes.  The SUR, other 
states, and stakeholders receive 20 minutes each.110  The SUR may make voluntary 
pledges/commitments, reply to questions not adequately answered previously, and 
reiterate rejected recommendations.111  Comments and questions may be presented by 
member and observer states.  Other stakeholders may provide “general comments,”112 a 
contentious topic.  The relationship between the WG and Plenary was intensely 
debated.113  Bifurcation allows more focus, efficiency and separation between review 
process and the process of adoption.114  But states in the African Group were concerned 
about a “double review” and wanted to limit plenary discussion, particularly general 
comments by civil society, strictly to the WG process and outcome document, nothing 
new.115  The Western Group preferred to look at issues not sufficiently addressed in the 
WG, with greater latitude for NGOs.  In the end, the President’s attempt to clarify116 only 
caused greater confusion.117
 Since the UPR is cooperative, the SUR is to be fully involved in the outcome.
 
118  It 
cannot eliminate recommendations in the outcome document,119 which are a main focus 
for the subsequent review,120 but accepts only those it chooses.  The outcome may 
include voluntary commitments and pledges, but the status of election pledges is not 
clear.121
                                                     
110 A/HCR/PRST/8/1 (2008) para. 16. 
  The outcome may also assess the situation of human rights in the reviewed 
country, positive developments and challenges, identification of best practices, provision 
111 See Abede (2009) pp. 17-18 for examples. 
112 A/HRC/5/1 (2007) para. 31. 
113 See Abede (2009) pp. 17-19. 
114 Abraham (2007) pp. 35-36. 
115 See Abede (2009) pp. 17-19. 
116 A/HCR/PRST/8/1 (2008) para. 6. 
117 See Sweeney (2009) p.216. 
118 A/HRC/5/1 (2007) para. 33. 
119 Id., paras. 27 and 28. 
120 Id., para. 34. 
121 Id., para 27(e). 
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of technical assistance, and proposals for cooperation to promote and protect human 
rights.122
 With respect to follow-up, the HRC reserves authority to decide.  Resolution 5/1 
says that the outcome report “should be implemented,” largely to be determined in the 
subsequent review cycle, while any specific action for “persistent non-cooperation” with 
the mechanism is conditioned on “exhaustion of all efforts.”
  
123
4 HUMAN RIGHTS LAW AND THE UPR 
  With such vague criteria, 
it seems fair to wonder whether such authority to act will ever be utilized, or agreed 
upon, particularly when recommendations are often subject to vagueness and ambiguity, 
too. 
 The Preamble of Resolution 60/251 provides that, while national and regional 
particularities and various historical, cultural and religious backgrounds must be borne in 
mind, more importantly, “all States, regardless of their political, economic and cultural 
systems, have the duty to promote and protect all human rights and fundamental 
freedoms.”  They have further “responsibilities, in conformity with the Charter, to respect 
human rights and fundamental freedoms for all, without distinction of any kind.” 
 Concerning obligations at the UN, General Assembly Resolution 32/130 sets forth 
the precept that all human rights are inalienable, indivisible and interdependent, whether 
civil, political, economic, social and/or cultural, and that equal attention and urgent 
consideration should be given to their implementation, promotion and protection.124
                                                     
122 Id., para. 27. 
  
Questions of human rights should be examined globally and consider both the overall 
context and health of the society and the need for promotion of full human dignity of the 
123 Id., paras. 37 and 38. 
124 A/RES/32/130 (1977), paras. 1(a) and (c). 
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person, looking to the experience and contribution of both developed and developing 
countries.125
 All work within the United Nations system with respect to human rights questions 
should take Resolution 32/130 into account.
 
126  Donnelly sees it as a guide.127
 The Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action
  It 
establishes a process obligation within UN human rights mechanisms that extends to the 
UPR and state conduct therein, resting on a pillar of good faith and friendly relations to 
promote international peace and security. 
128
 The sources of human rights law applicable in the UPR context help states 
understand the spirit and extent of obligations, to better perform their roles and 
responsibilities therein.  Principles of human rights generally enter the body of 
international law through the channels cited by Article 38.1 of the ICJ Statute:  treaties, 
customary law, and general principles of law common to the major legal systems of the 
world.  Unlike traditional international law, however, where norms gradually develop 
through consensus and bilateral practice between states, principles based on human 
dignity are less encumbered.  Legal obligations in human rights may arise not only from 
traditional means, but through undertakings or, arguably, conduct that, in equity, creates 
 affirmed the principle in 
Resolution 32/130.  States and others regularly pledge allegiance to such notions, in 
treaties and elsewhere, then forget them in practice at the national or international 
levels, where the politics of self-interest clouds the picture.  Among reasons states offer 
for noncompliance is a claim that precise content of many rights are vague and permit 
scrutiny that infringes on state rights of self-determination.  Of course, dignity interests 
may do exactly that, conflict with state sovereignty. 
                                                     
125 Id., paras. 1(d) and (h). 
126 Id., para. 1. 
127 See Donnelly (1983) p. 547. 
128 A/CONF.157/23 (12 July 1993). 
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a “detrimental reliance” in those to whom duty is owed.129
4.1 THE UN CHARTER AND UDHR 
  A brief discussion of the 
sources therefore follows.  
 The UN Charter, supplemented by the UDHR, affects every state’s human rights 
obligations across the spectrum, of how states treat people, not each other.  Article 1.3 of 
the UN Charter expresses the importance of human rights and cooperation in an 
international order of changing subjects and power.  Articles 55 and 56 of the Charter 
require states “pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in cooperation with 
the Organization” to help achieve respect and observance of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms for all without discrimination.  Gutter indicates that Article 56 has 
no specific obligation for states to act at the national level to promote human rights, only 
within the UN.130  But decades earlier, Hersch Lauterpacht maintained otherwise, that the 
Charter imposed on members the “legal duty to respect and observe fundamental human 
rights and freedoms.”131
 The UDHR is not simply an interstate affair, but goes to the core relationship 
between states and persons, based on human dignity.  It constrains state behavior, but 
also provides direction to create “positive” legal rights through legislation and 
administrative practice.
  This duty applies to state conduct toward the UN, other states, 
and persons.  In any event, the UPR falls squarely within Article 56, not to mention the 
pledge incorporated in Resolution 32/130, discussed in Chapter 4, that should permeate 
into all procedures like the HRC and UPR that come under UN purview. 
132
                                                     
129 See Restatement (Second) of Contracts (1981) § 90. 
  No state can legitimately argue the UDHR has no legal 
mandate.  Numerous UN resolutions and statements refer, for example, to “the duty of 
130 Gutter (2006) p. 19. 
131 Lauterpacht (1950) p.147. 
132 See Eide (2007) p. 141. 
 25 
states to fully and faithfully observe the provisions of the Universal Declaration.”133
 If one assumes the UDHR defines the general pledge agreed in the Charter, then 
failure to respect its enumerated rights may constitute violations, even without consensus 
about the character and extent of obligations, and even if no remedy yet exists.  States in 
the UPR mechanism, and other stakeholders, may fulfill their obligations expansively, 
using UDHR provisions as the basis to scrutinize and measure country performance, 
particularly as formal accountability is lacking. 
  It is 
recognized explicitly in Resolution 60/251 creating the HRC. 
4.2 THE COVENANTS (TREATIES) 
 After the UDHR’s adoption in 1948, it took almost 30 years, colored by the Cold 
War setting and colonial dimension, for the Covenants to take effect.  Over 160 states fall 
within their purview.134  Until then, international human rights law, generally, was built on 
the Charter and UDHR, custom from state practice, and general principles established 
from state acts, such as national laws.  The Covenants and other human rights treaties 
have significant roles, a separate topic.135
 The Covenants provide a legal frame to clarify national and international 
obligations and diminish the effects of Article 2.7.  Within their structures state 
sovereignty finds a counterbalance.  States have authority, for example, to complain 
  Treaty monitoring bodies, composed of 
representatives serving in personal capacities, focus on compliance, largely removed from 
the political part of international relations where the UPR resides.  They are quasi-judicial 
organs of the UN system, each with a distinct, independent mandate.  There is a need for 
interaction, however, particularly as Resolution 60/251 requires the UPR to complement 
treaty mechanisms. 
                                                     
133 A/RES/18/1904 (XVIII) (20 November 1963), the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination. 
134 Ratifications listed at UN Treaty Collection Database. 3 May 2010 
<http://treaties.un.org/Pages/Treaties.aspx?id=4&subid=A&lang=en>. 
135 The thesis limits itself to these two foundational human treaties. 
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about alleged violations by other states under the ICCPR.136
 General Comment 31 concerns the general obligation imposed by ICCPR, Article 2.  
While the treaty is: 
  Though never utilized, such 
procedure establishes existence of a community interest and corresponding obligations to 
each and all states parties.  Besides their monitoring functions, treaty bodies and experts 
create a flow of information, from varied sources, that might not otherwise exist 
regarding state performance in human rights, such as general comments that assist and 
influence both states and rights holders to delineate the nature and scope of human 
rights and obligations and issues of compliance. 
couched in terms of the obligations of State Parties towards individuals […] 
every State Party has a legal interest in the performance by every other 
State Party of its obligations […] from the fact that the “rules concerning 
the basic rights of the human person” are erga omnes obligations and that 
[…] there is a United Nations Charter obligation to promote universal 
respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental 
freedoms.137
 Other obligations are explained in General Comment 3, concerning ICESCR, Article 
2,
 
138 that notes the interdependence and indivisibility of human rights, irrespective of 
political system, and that the core of obligation is to ensure satisfaction, by conduct, of 
minimum essential levels of each of the rights to the maximum of available resources.139  
The Committee expressed, “in accordance with Articles 55 and 56 of the Charter […] [and] 
with well-established principles of international law […] international cooperation for 
development and […] realization of economic, social and cultural rights is an obligation of 
all States.”140
                                                     
136 See ICCPR, Art. 41. 
 
137 CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (2004) para 2. 
138 E/1991/23(SUPP) (14 December 1990) pp. 83-87. 
139 Id., para. 10. 
140 Id., para 14.  
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 Human rights include the right to demand state policies and legislation that 
genuinely pursue the objective of full realization.141  In this context, the state’s burden is 
to demonstrate it made every effort to use all resources at its disposal, as a matter of 
priority, to satisfy its obligation.  Overall, the state must strive to ensure the widest 
possible enjoyment of rights under the prevailing circumstances, monitor their realization, 
and devise strategies and programs for promotion, irrespective of resource constraints.142
 The UPR’s relationship to the Covenants is complicated, a thesis topic by itself 
involving, inter alia, scope of coverage and complementarity issues discussed briefly, in 
Sections 3.3 and 5.3.4, respectively.  It will take years to discover if the UPR will be used 
by states to reinforce the Covenants (and special procedures) or to create outcomes with 
conflicting recommendations that could undermine treaty obligations.  Nonetheless, even 
if a state has not ratified a treaty, the guiding principles that underlie treaty obligations 
seem applicable to UPR examinations, keeping in mind that treaties have distinct and 
independent mandates that remain for those states that have consented to be bound by 
the treaties and their monitoring procedures.  
 
4.3 HUMAN RIGHTS DEVELOPMENT AND CUSTOMARY LAW 
 Obligations of states in human rights, and thus the UPR, remain tethered to 
traditional customary law and modern human rights law.  Although customary 
international law is not expressly included in the UPR basis of review, it cannot be 
summarily excluded.  Violations of customary international law of human rights, in 
substance, require a nexus to official governmental policy, presumed when acts, 
especially by government officials, are repeated or notorious and steps not taken to 
prevent them or punish the perpetrators.143  A consistent pattern is necessary, unless the 
conduct involves acts “inherently gross,”144
                                                     
141 Eide, (2007) p. 143. 
 particularly shocking because of a right’s 
142 E/1991/23(SUPP) (14 December 1990), para. 11.  
143 Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States (1987) §702, Comment b. 
144 Peremptory norms (jus cogens) enumerated in clauses (a) to (f). Agreements that violate them are void. 
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importance or the gravity of the violation.145  Violations may be deemed “gross” ipso facto 
when human rights are internationally recognized as fundamental and intrinsic to human 
dignity.146
 Traditional customary law and modern human rights law exist on separate planes 
in the manner of formation, and limitations of one should not impede the other.  The 
habitual approach to impose obligation is to rely on opinio juris to confirm state practice 
or perhaps infer opinio juris from existing state practice.  The North Sea Continental 
Shelf
  Although this provides a background for what constitutes violations, it does 
not explain how non-treaty human rights law can develop. 
147 cases indicated, to qualify as custom, state practice must evidence a belief it is 
obligated by the rule of law requiring it.148  Value is attached to what states do more than 
what they say.  This view currently prevails in the HRC and UPR.  But when issues of 
dignity and community values are predominant (human rights, jus ad bellum, armed 
conflict, the environment), the established approach appears problematic.149
 Establishing obligation in the area human or humanitarian rights seems less to do 
with custom than with conduct.  Traditional custom mostly affects actions between 
states, not states and individuals.  Development of state obligation can be less onerous 
than in other fields of international law.
 
150  Organs that administer human rights law, 
treaty bodies and international tribunals, have tendency to use a deductive, conduct 
based approach, arising from fundamental legal and equitable principles rather than 
induction.  This approach looks at state conduct, emphasizing what they say rather than 
what they do, to define state practice.151
                                                     
145 Ibid.  See also §701, Reporters’ Note 6.   
  It relates to the equity approach discussed in 
146 Such as freedom from systematic harassment, invasions of the privacy of the home, arbitrary arrest and 
detention (even if not prolonged); denial of freedom of conscience and religion; and denial of basic privacy 
such as the right to marry and raise a family. 
147 1969 ICJ Reports 3. 
148 Id., para 77. 
149 73 Int'l L. Ass'n Rep. Conf. (2008) p. 670. 
150 See Meron (1989) p. 113. 
151 Assent to their pronouncements is deemed further indication of state practice. 
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Section 4.4.  It was discussed in Nicaragua152 where the ICJ observed it “must satisfy itself 
that the existence of the rule in the opinio juris of States is confirmed by practice,” thus 
turning around North Sea Continental Shelf.153  Inconsistent state conduct, if condemned 
and the state does not claim to act as a matter of right, is a breach, not indicative of a new 
rule.154
 Akehurst said that state practice means any act or statement by a state from 
which views about customary law can be inferred.
 
155  Conduct consistent with the 
deductive interpretation of development includes “virtually universal adherence to the 
United Nations Charter and its human rights provisions, and virtually universal and 
frequently reiterated acceptance of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights even if 
only in principle.”156  Actions by states to conform their national law or practice to 
standards or principles declared by international bodies, and incorporation of human 
rights provisions, directly or by reference, in national constitutions and laws would 
strongly seem to establish further basis for reliance that the state is obligated.157 So, too, 
may communications or actions which reflect that certain practices violate international 
human rights law, like a condemnation or adverse reaction to violations by other states.158  
Many of these wide and varied actions are absorbed into international law as general 
principles common to the major state legal systems.159
                                                     
152 1986 ICJ Reports 14. 
 
153 Id., para 184. 
154 Id., para 186. The new approach is not uncontroversial, however, as illustrated by the US reaction to the 
ICRC study Customary International Humanitarian Law. 10 May 2010 
<http://www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/review-866-p443/$File/irrc_866_Bellinger.pdf>. 
155 Akehurst (1977) p. 1.  
156 Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States (1987) §701, Reporters’ Note 2. 
157 Ibid. 
158 See Dimitrijevic (2006) p. 5. 
159 Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States (1987) §701, Reporters’ Note 2. 2 and 
§702, Reporters' Note 1. 
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 Issues of human rights are primarily seen in how a state treats people under its 
jurisdiction, but states owe duties to all other states.160  A state may expect that other 
states will not act to increase the likelihood of individual and collective damage.  The right 
against illegal use of force under Article 2.4 is a prime example.  Human rights violations 
can also threaten international peace and security and result in breaches of duties owed 
to the community of states as a whole and its members.  Obligations erga omnes are 
recognized in customary human rights law, and corresponding rights to protection 
concerning basic human rights have entered the body of general international law.161  
Rules of customary law allow any state, in principle, to invoke ordinary remedies available 
when its rights are violated.162
 In the political UPR forum, where the dignity interest should take precedence, duty 
to the whole extends into state conduct during the UPR process, discussed in Section 5.3, 
where transparency, participation and efficiency seem indispensible to create credibility 
in the eyes of the world.  Custom and conduct merge with the interest of the community 
as a whole to provide a basis for inquiry.  As global values gain significance, the deductive 
method to identify and implement rules of international human rights law may increase in 
familiarity and acceptability.  Interactive dialogue presents an opportunity where states, 
with the participation and support of stakeholders, may project ideas and solutions to 
further dignity and community interests, followed by recommendations, and grow 
promoted norms of behavior and effective scrutiny. 
 
4.4 JUS COGENS AND PEREMPTORY NORMS  
 Pursuant to Article 53 of the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties, a jus 
cogens norm is: “accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a 
whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only 
                                                     
160 Such as erga omnes obligations, discussed below. 
161 Barcelona Traction, 1970 ICJ Reports 3, paras. 33-34.   
162 Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States §703(2) and Comment b to that 
section. 
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by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character.”163  The 
International Law Commission (ILC) introduces the concept as “peremptory norms.”164  
Jus Cogens has relevance outside the scope of treaty law based on consent and 
reciprocity.  States have independent, positive duties to cooperate to end any serious 
breach arising under a peremptory norm of general international law.165
 In the human rights context, jus cogens has overlapping, interdependent dignity 
and communitarian components.  In Nicaragua, the ICJ cited the ILC, that the UN Charter 
“concerning the prohibition of the use of force in itself constitutes a conspicuous example 
of a rule in international law having the character of jus cogens,”
 
 166
 Not until 2006 did the ICJ refer to jus cogens for the first time, in Congo v Rwanda, 
to directly say that prohibition of genocide has the character of a peremptory norm.
 but did not use jus 
cogens in a holding.  For example, The Wall case, where states were advised to lawfully 
cooperate to end serious breaches of obligations arising under a peremptory norm, was 
based on obligations erga omnes. 
167  
Judge Lauterpacht called genocide, the worst offence against the human person, “one of 
the few undoubted examples of jus cogens”168  Whether other fundamental human rights 
have similar status is more contentious.  Judge Tanaka proclaimed all human rights have 
peremptory status.169  However, it is more accurate to say there is general agreement 
over some rights170 while others have varying degrees of support.171
 According to the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law, peremptory 
norms are established through acceptance and recognition by a “large majority” of states, 
 
                                                     
163 A/Conf.39/27 (23 May 1969). 
164 ILC Draft Articles on Responsibility (2001) pp. 110-116. A/56/10 (2001). 
165 Id., Section 41 and commentary. 
166 1986 ICJ Reports 14, 100. 
167 2006 ICJ General List No 126, para. 42. 
168 Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia , Separate Opinion, 1993 ICJ Reports 407, 440, para. 100. 
169 South West Africa, Second Phase, Dissenting Opinion, 1966 ICJ Reports 3, 250, 293. 
170 Such as prohibitions involving slavery, racial discrimination and apartheid. 
171 Prohibition of of torture, right to life, equality and non-discrimination.  Dignity based rights violated by 
grave breaches of international humanitarian law may also possess peremptory status. 
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even over dissent by “a very small number of states.”172
4.5 EQUITABLE PRINCIPLES 
  Skepticism remains over the 
scope of the doctrine.  During UPR proceedings, states and civil society may seek to elicit 
which matters constitute jus cogens, then to broaden the application to acts that further 
these peremptory norms to accelerate evolution of the international legal system where 
human rights from dignity and personal autonomy have greater influence. 
 International law between states, especially the law of treaties, functions much 
like a contract between parties.  Implied is a duty of good faith.173  Thus, obligations from 
conduct may justify use of equity as a further source of law in the form of an estoppel, 
based on detrimental reliance.  The seeds of estoppel are strewn throughout customary 
public international law, both with regard to relations between states and relations 
between states and private parties.174  In Nuclear Tests,175
It is well recognized that declarations made by way of unilateral acts, 
concerning legal or factual situations, may have the effect of creating legal 
obligations.  […] [E]ven though not made within the context of 
international negotiations, [it] is binding. In these circumstances, nothing in 
the nature of a quid pro quo, nor any subsequent acceptance of the 
declaration, nor even any reply or reaction from other States, is required 
[…] since such a requirement would be inconsistent with the strictly 
unilateral nature of the juridical act by which the pronouncement by the 
State was made.
 the ICJ said: 
176
Intent to be bound, as expressed by declaration or conduct, confers upon it the character 
of a legal undertaking.  Thereafter, the state is legally required to follow a course of 
conduct consistent with it.
 
177
                                                     
172 Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States §102 and reporter’s note 6 (1986). 
  Electoral pledges by states are examples.  Such matters 
deserve examination at the UPR. 
173 See VCLT Article 31.1.  See also Restatement (Second) Contracts §205. 
174 See Bowden (1993) fn. 5 for examples. 
175 1974 ICJ Reports 457. 
176 Id., para. 46. 
177 Ibid. 
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 At its heart, estoppel is the notion that one party to a dispute should not be 
permitted to take a position inconsistent with one previously taken, when it would be 
unjust to the other party to do so.178  Thus, it generally applies to the same character of 
conduct defined by Eide that causes insecurity and fear impeding enjoyment of rights, 
calling for protection by the state, such as fraud or unethical behavior,179 exploitation or 
corruption, and unconscionable acts covered by peremptory norms.180  Promissory 
estoppel developed to enforce a promise absent bargained-for consideration, where 
doing so was necessary to avoid injustice.181
 The American Law Institute (ALI), in Section 90 of the Restatement (Second) 
Contracts, defines the doctrine as follows:  “A promise which the promisor should 
reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third 
person and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be 
avoided only by enforcement of the promise.”  Courts, in essence, substitute detrimental 
reliance for the element of consideration required to make an enforceable obligation.
   
182  
There must be actual and reasonable reliance on the promise, determined case-by-case, 
taking all factors into consideration.  Probability of reliance lends support to the 
enforcement of the executory exchange.  In this area. reliance may have replaced promise 
as the basis of liability.183
 Based on the foregoing, in the UPR, it seems reasonable and appropriate to rely on 
the promises or representations, express or implied, of a state concerning its law, or acts 
undertaken respecting human dignity or community interests, or to win the votes of other 
states.  These create obligations, the failure of which to comply, if detriment has been 
suffered, would seem subject matter for the UPR concerning the contradiction(s), 
followed by appropriate recommendations and specific follow-up to prevent further 
 
                                                     
178 Bowden (1993) p. 127. 
179 See Eide (2007) p. 150. 
180 See Restatement (Second) Contracts §208. 
181 See Luepke (2002) pp.132-133.  
182 Ibid. 
183 Yorio (1991) p. 112. 
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injustice or impunity.  If nothing else, getting these matters in the public domain may 
deter states from making promises they do not intend to keep. 
5 OBLIGATIONS AND CATEGORIES OF INTERESTS AT THE UPR 
 Compliance with legally binding human rights obligations helps improve human 
rights for the ultimate beneficiaries on the ground.  What human rights obligations do 
states owe, and into what categories of interests may these obligations fall with respect to 
the UPR?  According to Eide, despite an intrinsic belief that human rights will weaken their 
grip on sovereignty, states are actually stronger when obligations are observed to improve 
realization.184  The international responsibility of Article 1.3 to promote and encourage 
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, by implication, furthers the UN 
purpose to “develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of 
equal rights and self-determination of peoples.”185
 A fundamental purpose of human rights is to limit state power over persons and 
empower exercise of autonomous rights to live in dignity and realize full potential.  
Human rights obligations help establish guarantees that governments cannot neglect in 
performance of their duties.  Article 22 of the UDHR states that each person as a member 
of society is entitled to realize rights indispensable for dignity and free development of 
the personality.  Article 28 of the UDHR provides:  “Everyone is entitled to a social and 
international order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be 
fully realized.”  Principles molding compliance help states and stakeholders know and 
translate rights and responsibilities into implementation. 
  Article 55 reinforces Article 1.3 and 
under Article 56 states pledge to act cooperatively to achieve Article 55.   
                                                     
184 Eide (1987) paras. 200-202. 
185 UN Charter, Article 1.2. 
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 In the context of the evolving UPR, categories of interests emerge from 
examination of state human rights obligations under international law.  Like human rights 
in general, they are interrelated and interdependent, and often overlapping.  They 
provide criteria to evaluate the UPR mechanism and state conduct, to help draw partial 
conclusions about the UPR and its place in the greater UN human rights machinery. 
5.1 INTERESTS BASED ON DIGNITY OF PERSONS  
5.1.1 Personal Autonomy  
 The right to personal autonomy, to secure individual enjoyment of human rights, is 
recognized by the Charter and UDHR as an aspect of agency that states must respect.  It is, 
arguably, not unlike the right of self-determination to exercise control over both one’s 
destiny and resources, while not acting coercively to subordinate exercise of the same by 
others.186
Everyone, as a member of society, has the right to social security and is 
entitled to realization, through national effort and international co-
operation and in accordance with the organization and the resources of 
each State, of the economic, social and cultural rights indispensable for his 
dignity and the free development of his personality. 
  Article 22 of the UDHR states: 
The above provision was a compromise between competing views about whether 
obligations should be expressly part of the UDHR component.187  Obligations were not 
included, perhaps causing Socialist Bloc abstention in voting for the UDHR.188  The 
premise for Article 22 is that “no personal liberty could exist without economic security 
and independence. A man in need is not a free man.”189
 “Self-determination” is grounded to the tradition international law paradigm, 
where battles were mainly fought on an external level, amid shifting political power 
between states, developed through custom and state practice.  As discussed in Section 
 
                                                     
186 Eide (1987), at paras. 196-199 discussed this in the context of self-determination of states and peoples. 
187 See Id., para. 98.  
188 Id., fn. 63, citing E/CN.4/SR.81, p. 28. 
189 Id., fn. 62, citing E/CN.4/SR.64, p. 5. 
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4.3, when dignity is the foundation, legal obligations develop differently.  The principle of 
self-determination thus expanded to include “peoples” on the internal level and, based on 
the UDHR, appears to extend to the micro level down to each person, seen in the concept 
of autonomy.190  Unfettered, however, such freedom to develop without intereference 
can lead to asymmetries, internally or internationally, and conditions dangerous for 
human rights.191  International law has helped provide redress,192
5.1.2 Respect, Protect, Fulfill 
 but fragmentation of 
law and cultural perceptions of human rights present challenges   The UPR can serve to 
balance competing, legitimate claims between states and individuals, bringing them to the 
table, and from such a deliberative process may result outcomes that are realistic and 
provide added value.   
 When states comply with human rights obligations, theory crosses into the 
practical.  While human rights are grounded in freedom of the individual, largely from the 
state, Eide indicates the state must protect against harmful private acts that create 
insecurity and fear, like violence, exploitation, corruption and fraud.193  This protection 
function partly underlies the emergence of the liberal state.  The obligation goes further, 
including some common goods beyond the capacity of private action, like primary 
education for all or a core social safety net.194  As a corollary, the state must also ensure 
that people not experience discrimination in the enjoyment of their rights.195
 Treaty bodies took an approach of “passive” duties associated with civil and 
political rights and “active” duties associated with economic, social and cultural rights.  
Eide saw three different types of obligations, each applicable to both categories of rights 
 
                                                     
190 One could argue that states act as fictitious persons when they exercise self-determination in 
international law.  
191 See Eide (1987) paras. 200-202. 
192 Ibid. 
193 Eide (2007) pp. 145-146. 
194 Ibid. 
195 Ibid. 
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in combination and balance between them.196  As UN Special Rapporteur for Food in 
1987, he constructed a tripartite typology of human rights obligations owed by states.197  
States are obligated to respect, protect and fulfill human rights.  These types of 
obligations are interrelated and interdependent in the context of all human rights, 
whether requiring immediate implementation of progressive realization.198
 The respect obligation is fundamental.  The state, and all its organs and agents, are 
not to violate integrity of the person or infringe on individual freedom, including use of 
material resources one sees fit to best satisfy basic needs.
 
199  It is not subject to 
progressive realization.200  When individuals or groups can take care of their needs 
without hindering others from the same, states must not interfere.201
 The protect obligation requires the state to prevent others from violating 
individual integrity, freedom of action, or other human rights, including enjoyment of 
material resources.
  This obligation 
appears universally applicable as customary human rights law, codified under the Charter 
and UDHR.   
202  Protection generally involves wrongful or oppressive conduct, and 
has wide application and implementation.  As with the respect obligation, immediate 
performance is required.  Protection can also give rise to activities and measures that 
themselves impose duties to respect, protect and fulfill.203  For example, it may cover the 
exercise of due diligence to prevent attacks on life, physical integrity, or liberty.204  States 
must act to punish violations and attempt, if possible, restoration and/or compensation 
for damages.205
                                                     
196 Ibid. 
 
197 E/CN.4/Sub.2/1987/23 (1987). 
198 Eide (2007) p. 156. 
199 Eide (1987) para 67. 
200 Id., para. 72. 
201 Id., para. 67. 
202 Id., para 68. 
203 See Eide (2007) pp. 150-151.  Measures to respect or to fulfill share this feature.  
204 Velásquez Rodriguez at paras. 79 and 166. See also Hessbruegge (2004) p. 283.   
205 See Hessbruegge p. 275. 
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 The fulfill obligation requires state measures to ensure opportunities for each 
individual to fully enjoy all human rights as recognized in the human rights instruments, 
yet cannot be secured by personal efforts.206  Fulfillment may occur in different ways.  It 
does not mean to simply give.  In most cases it can be met with facilitation, like instituting 
a social security system to which people contribute.207  But when, for reasons beyond 
their control, people cannot take care of their own needs, the obligation rises to provide.  
Eide sees promotion as part the fulfill obligation, particularly raising awareness to state 
agents, but it extends to all parts of the typology.208
 Obligations to respect, protect and fulfill further contain interrelated aspects 
regarding conduct and result.
 
209  Conduct goes to the behavior a duty-holder should 
follow or abstain from.  Result looks to a particular outcome to attain through 
implementation of policies and programs.210
At stake is whether the UPR can help make states meet their dignity obligations at 
ground level.  The goal is optimal balance between freedoms and satisfaction of needs, 
considering the sovereign rights of states and peoples, taking account of different 
contexts and levels of development and social organization.
  Obligations of conduct should be specific.  
Obligations of result, absent some ability to feasibly measure, may only be intended to 
build political effect and momentum.  A parallel is seen in UPR recommendations.  Those 
that are specific and concern matters of conduct, compared to aspiration of results, likely 
have better chance of follow-up and implementation.  Arguably, state undertakings like 
election pledges assume the character of a binding conduct obligation and should be 
particularly scrutinized as such, in the context of the wider UPR examination of results. 
211
                                                     
206 Eide (1987) para. 69. 
  As the UPR moves 
forward, the typology may be a template for examination, to raise, universally, in unique 
207 Eide (2007) p. 152. 
208 Id. at p. 153. 
209 Paragraph 7.  See also General Comment 12 CESCR, E/C.12/1999/5 (12 May 1999) at paras. 15 and 16. 
210 Eide (1987) para. 71. 
211 Id., para. 70. 
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reviews, an approach that balances interests and permits the SUR to assess its own 
compliance, satisfying the requirements of Resolution 5/1.  
5.2 INTERESTS BASED ON COMMUNITY OF STATES 
 The community interests of states, individually and as a whole, gives rise to a 
different types of obligations, though connected to dignity.  Textbook examples of such 
interests are in areas like piracy and Chapters VI and VII of the UN Charter, involving 
dispute resolution and state duties regarding maintenance of international peace and 
security.  Implied in the group relationship among states are duties of good faith and 
cooperation, and responsibilities with respect to obligations erga omnes.212
5.2.1 Good Faith and the Meaning of Cooperation 
 
 Good faith is an underlying theme in public international and domestic law.  
Nuclear Tests stated:  “One of the basic principles governing the creation and 
performance of legal obligations, whatever their source, is the principle of good faith.”213  
As discussed in Section 4.4, good faith is implied in the quasi-contractual setting of 
international relations and domestic laws of states.  Bowden illustrates that German civil 
law starts with "performance in good faith" and Egyptian law requires good faith in 
performance of contracts, binding the party “not only as regards its expressed conditions, 
but also as regards everything which, according to law, usage and equity is deemed, in 
view of the nature of the obligation, to be a necessary sequel to the contract.”214
 Resolution 60/251 provides that the UPR shall be cooperative, but the term is 
undefined.  A non-adversarial procedure was intended, to change the dynamic from the 
  Good 
faith conduct thus extends to acts foreseeable and implied from obligations and 
undertakings, including those from participation in the UN and UPR and the 
implementation of policies, resolutions and outcomes. 
                                                     
212 The literal meaning of the Latin term is "in relation to everyone." 
213 1974 ICJ Reports 457, para. 49. 
214 Bowden (1993) p. 128. 
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politicization at the CHR over country specific criticism of states’ affairs.  Success may be 
near impossible to achieve because of diversity and different realities, yet virtually all 
states share this common interest.  Getting to the core of “cooperation” is arguably the 
key to reform efforts after the CHR.  The UPR mechanism is but one of the playing fields. 
 As touched on previously, Articles 1.3, 55 and 56 of the Charter set forth individual 
and collective duties for all states in the community to cooperate as a component of 
compliance.  Here, cooperation is substantive, positive conduct with a nexus to 
implementation of dignity rights.  Such cooperative conduct manifests good faith and 
friendly relations.  It occurs, for example, from a standing invitation to special procedure 
rapportuers or promotion and provision of education, advisory services, technical 
assistance, and capacity building. 
 A different connotation of cooperation comes from Article 2.7.  It is procedural 
and negative in application, with a nexus not to dignity, but political, sovereign self-
interest.  In this context, it can be used as a sword to cut away scrutiny.  At the first 
session of the HRC on 20 June 2006, China, for example, indicated success would largely 
depend “on whether countries […] treat each other as equals, and address their 
differences in a constructive way.”215  Cuba, more provocative, framed the matter in 
terms where the developed North gets impunity, the underdeveloped South scrutiny, 
especially “those that do not bow their head.”216  Some states utilize “confrontation” as 
justification not to cooperate in substance, for example, with appointed representatives 
or special procedures.217
 Presently, the spirit of Article 2.7 cooperation prevails in the UPR process.  SUR 
consent is needed to adopt recommendations and the outcome report.  But cooperation 
to avoid “confrontation” can limit the ability to engage in effective, realistic scrutiny or 
     
                                                     
215 Statement byYang Jiechi, 20 June 2006. 5 May 2010 
<http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/statements/china.pdf>. See Gaer (2007) pp. 131-
132.  
216 Statement by Felipe Pérez Roque, 20 June 2006. 5 May 2010. 
<http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/statements/cuba.pdf>. 
217 See Gaer (2007) p. 130. 
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offer constructive criticism.  It can weaken recommendations so as to obtain SUR consent.  
Cooperation required by Resolution 60/251, as now practiced, tends to stifle discourse 
and hinder the more fundamental substantive cooperation required by the Charter.  The 
larger question remains whether such a state-centric cooperative approach will actually 
bring change from states that commit gross violations of human rights. 
5.2.2 Community Interests and Obligations Erga Omnes 
 The community obligation mainly involves the community of states and 
interactions between states, but it has a larger dimension.  It includes considerations of 
individual dignity interests, largely developed from matters of diplomatic protection and 
treatment of foreign nationals, matters of concern to all members of the community.  
Barcelona Traction recognized that every state has a legal interest in protection of such 
interests.218  From them derive obligations erga omnes that include outlawing acts of 
aggression and genocide, as well as principles and rules concerning the basic rights of the 
human person.  Some of the corresponding rights of protection have entered the body of 
general international law, others by instrument.219  Obligations erga omnes was 
referenced in subsequent cases.220  In the advisory opinion on The Wall221 the Court 
suggested a legal obligation to not recognize the results of breaches.222
 When a state acts with respect to obligations erga omnes, it does for the 
collective, not in an individual capacity.  The duty owed is to the “international community 
as a whole.”
 
223
                                                     
218 Barcelona Traction, 1970 ICJ Reports 3, para. 33.  See also ILA Report (2008) p. 668.  
  This is broader than the community of states, which it subsumes.  Article 
219 1970 ICJ Reports 3, para. 34. 
220 For example, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 
Preliminary Objections, Judgment, 1996 ICJ Reports 595, 616. 
221 Legal  Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 
2004 ICJ Reports 136. 
222 Id., para. 159. 
223 Article 48, ILC Draft Articles on Responsibility (2001) pp. 110-116. A/56/10 (2001).  The notion was 
previously recognized in Article 59, 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.  See Crawford (2002) pp. 
276-280.       
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48 of the ILC Draft Articles on Responsibility uses this broader terminology, perhaps 
purposefully, to conform to the view that the international community now includes 
important subjects other than states.224
 Emergence of transnational issues, where territorial boundaries are almost 
meaningless, further strengthens this notion of the whole, along with corresponding 
duties of each state.  There community interest includes a duty that activities within a 
state’s jurisdiction or control not damage common, shared resources.
  Article 28 of the UDHR says that everyone is 
entitled to a social and international order in where the rights and freedoms of the UDHR 
can be fully realized.  From a human rights standpoint, realization of such social and 
international order is the duty of the international community as a whole.   
225  This abuse of 
rights principle, from the Corfu Channel case,226 provides that sovereign rights are 
correlative, interdependent and subject to reciprocal limitations.227  Similar and 
complementing dignity rights at the domestic level, protection of obligations erga omnes 
conflict with state sovereignty in areas such as aggression, genocide, slavery and racial 
discrimination,228 and self-determination.229
 It was feared that erga omnes human rights obligations would open the floodgates 
of states turned prosecutor, but the issue has been raised sparingly,
 
230 understandably if 
one looks at the evolution of the UPR to date.  The stage is set, however, to further invoke 
state responsibility for breach of human rights obligations owed to the international 
community.  Each state has responsibility to work domestically and internationally to 
create and maintain the international order envisaged in article 28.231
                                                     
224 See Weiss (2002) p. 804. 
  Whether or not 
225 The natural environment is one such area, the “Common heritage of mankind” another.   
226 1949 ICJ Reports 4, 22. 
227 Eide (1987) para. 205. 
228 Barcelona Traction, para. 34.  See also Sivakumaran (2009) pp. 136-137. 
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states have the political will to act in a public setting, or choose traditional, less 
transparent means of diplomacy, remains to be seen. 
5.3 INTERESTS BASED ON THE PROCESS 
 In 1977, General Assembly Resolution 32/130, discussed in Chapter 4, decided the 
approach for future work within the UN system should take account that all human rights 
and fundamental freedoms “are inalienable and deserve equal attention.”232  Full 
realization was impossible unless consideration was given to implementation, promotion 
and protection.233
 The above decision, arguably, imposes a substantive process obligation, in addition 
to agreed principles that the UPR should be conducted in an “objective, transparent, 
non-selective, constructive, non-confrontational and non-politicized manner.”
  Paragraph 1(d) of Resolution 32/130 stated that human rights 
questions “should be examined globally, taking into account both the overall context of 
the various societies in which they present themselves, as well as the need for the 
promotion of the full dignity of the human person and the development and well-being of 
the society.” 
234
                                                     
232 
  
Behavior consistent with these dictates would seem to “respect, protect and fulfill” this 
duty to process, within the context of good faith and cooperation, as perhaps the crux of 
HRC reform.  Perception is in the eye of the beholder.  Decisions by states regarding the 
UPR process will prove determinative to where it follows.  When matters of dispute occur, 
a good faith, balanced approach, to the process, taking account of dignity and community 
interests, seems consistent with the objective to strengthen the mechanism and achieve 
cooperation under the UN Charter.   
A/RES/32/130 (1977), paras. (c) and (a). 
233 Id., paras. (a) and (b). 
234 Joint NGO Statement on Item 6, eighth session, HRC, 13 June 2008.   
 44 
5.3.1 Selectivity and State Participation 
 State selectivity in the process often occurs first in choosing how or when to 
participate in the interactive dialogue.  Member and observer states are free to select 
what they report, who will represent them, to whom they direct comments, questions 
and responses, and the content of recommendations, if any.  Politics is intimately 
involved.  States organize and act in groups and networks of common interests.  Block 
voting, which seriously affected the CHR, remains a major challenge at the HRC and, 
correspondingly, the UPR.235  States might, for example, commend friends, but offer no 
critical comments, questions or recommendations.  This has reached extremes, as in the 
reviews of Tunisia and Jordan.236
 Under present rules, particularly in important reviews, states may have insufficient 
time to adequately participate in the highly abbreviated UPR, and limits on opportunity to 
speak.  In reviews of China and Cuba in 2009, even with time limits slashed, almost half of 
the states were unable to speak or contribute recommendations.
 
237  The practice of 
forming a line where states provide laud to kill the time, ask softball questions, or propose 
vague recommendations, continues.238  NGOs have concluded the UPR does not move 
past politicization, but in some cases the opposite direction.239  The process obligation 
requires that states exercise good faith not to engage in such practices, particularly if 
orchestrated to filibuster,240
 Selective participation for some states may be an issue of resources.  In other 
words, the UPR is not true to purpose if only the most committed and well-resourced 
states can permanently engage.  Resolution 5/1 called for a UPR Voluntary Trust Fund to 
 because it violates the rights of others to participate and 
seek scrutiny. 
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237 ISHR (2010) p. 34. 
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facilitate participation of developing countries in the mechanism, particularly the Least 
Developed Countries.241  HRC Resolution 6/17 requested establishment of this fund, along 
with a Voluntary Fund for Financial and Technical Assistance, to provide, in conjunction 
with multilateral funding mechanisms, financial and technical assistance to help countries 
implement UPR recommendations.242
 Whatever the reason, in 2008 a notable drop off in attendance occurred at the 
WG, particularly in less prominent reviews.
  Funding states, meeting their responsibilities, 
would show compliance with process and community obligations and strengthen the UPR 
to ensure needed input for it to be relevant.   
243  Will state interests extend to human rights 
outside its region?  For example, 43 states took the floor in Colombia’s UPR, only one was 
African, and smaller states were reported much less likely in the interactive dialogue to 
engage states from different regions.244  Decreased, selective participation causes a 
corresponding decrease in contributions and recommendations, sometimes to states that 
most need them.  Outcome reports lacking critical comments and recommendations are 
less likely to reflect reality of the situation,245 and diminish potential realization of the 
UPR’s first objective, to “improve of the human rights situation on the ground.”246
5.3.2 Transparency and Inclusion Of Stakeholders 
  Full 
participation by states is appears essential for the long term. 
 The work of the HRC “shall be transparent, fair, impartial, and shall enable genuine 
dialogue.”247
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  Acting to facilitate these qualities into the UPR is an express component of 
the process obligation.  Resolution 5/1 calls for the UPR to “ensure” participation of all 
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relevant stakeholders.248
 Transparency issues arise in many variants.  One example occurred over the 
content and scope of “general comments” by NGOs at the Plenary.  Some states sought to 
impose the same limitation applying to states, to “express their views on the outcome of 
the review.”
  However, states monitor themselves in the UPR and control the 
process.  It is important to address apparent conflicts to maintain integrity.     
249  Differences erupted in the first one hour Plenary involving Bahrain.250  
Pakistan raised a point of order that NGOs should not re-open discussions of the WG, 
joined by Egypt, but address the outcome.  The President ruled that NGOs should “stick to 
the provision of Resolution 5/1 as well as all relevant documents.”  The ensuing discussion 
caused greater differences and confusion.251
 The broader language is significant for transparency and effective participation.  To 
illustrate, an NGO might refer to situations neglected in the WG.  In subsequent reviews, 
NGOs that raised human rights situations were selectively, repeatedly interrupted, even if 
their statements were linked to the WG outcome report or recommendations.
 
252  Only a 
few states protested the narrow application of Resolution 5/1, and apparently Egypt was 
emboldened to further insist all NGO comments be stricken from the official record.253
 Transparency and participation and the process obligation also intersect in 
cyberspace.
  
254
                                                     
248 A/HRC/5/1 (2007) para. 6(d).  
  Webcast of proceedings and sharing unfiltered information on the internet 
249 A/HRC/5/1 (2007) paras. 30, 31. 
250 For 9 June 2008 webcast of all statements mentioned, see HRC Webcast Archives. 6 May 2010 
<http://www.un.org/webcast/unhrc/archive.asp?go=080609#am>. See Sweeney (2009) pp. 215-216 and 
ISHR (2009) p. 46. 
251 Ibid. 
252 This occurred also in HRC general debate on the UPR, during NGO comments on African or OIC States, 
but not when NGOs criticized others, even without links to recommendations in the WG report.  See 
Sweeney (2009) p. 216, fn. 60. 
253 See ISHR (2009) p. 46. Slovenia (on behalf of the EU), Germany, Canada, Mexico and Switzerland 
objected.  Also Sweeney (2009) p.216. 
254 See HRC webcasts. 6 May 2010 <http://www.un.org/webcast/unhrc/>. See Extranet of the OHCHR.  22 
April 2010 <http://portal.ohchr.org/portal/page/portal/UPR> (User Name: HRC Extranet; Password: 
1Session).  Reports and documents also maintained there.  Another site, UPR-info.org, assembles extensive 
information for the UPR, including from NGOs. 22 April 2010 <http://www.upr-info.org/>. 
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can reduce disparities.  They expose not only the SUR, but each participant.  One reason 
the first UPR session was delayed to mid 2008 was differences over publishing stakeholder 
reports on the OHCHR website.255  SUR approaches vary during the interactive dialogue.  
Several European states were receptive to critical comments or acknowledged problems 
and challenges of racism or xenophobia.256  Others states, as indicated above, made great 
effort to line up “friends” for laudatory comments that shut out critical voices, perhaps 
suggesting something to hide.257  Some states interjected into reviews of others, as when 
Egypt tried to require Ecuador to reject a recommendation concerning sexual orientation 
that Ecuador had chosen to accept.258  Without webcasting the UPR, these acts may not 
have received attention.  Even so, dissemination on the internet and media attention are 
lagging.259
 Consultation with stakeholders is a manifestation of open, transparent and 
participatory conduct, particularly at the preparation stage and implementation stages.  
Promoting human rights on the ground includes input from those with shared stakes.  It is 
an act of good governance and should benefit a state’s overall health because the result 
of such discourse is legitimacy.  Wide participation brings greater realism into SUR reports 
and national plans.  States that involve civil society, and use the best practice to explain 
the nature and method of such involvement, act to respect, protect and fulfill the 
mechanism.  Most states apparently paid lip service to inclusion, however, and few SUR 
reports identified the specific nature (time, place and number) of consultations that were 
held.
 
260
                                                     
255 See Sweeney (2009) p. 208, fn. 23. 
  
256 Such as Norway and Italy. See A/HRC/WG.6/6/NOR/1 (14 September 2009) p. 7, para. 39 and  
A/HRC/WG.6/7/ITA/1 (16 November 2009) p. 14, para. 62. European processes also monitor these. 
257 See Brett (2008) p. 10.  
258 See Sweeney (2009) p. 212, citing ISHR (2009). 
259 ISHR (2010) p. 41. 
260 See Abede (2009) p. 11. 
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 NGOs previously enjoyed an established role at the CHR, including unwritten 
arrangements and practices that extended opportunity for active participation.261  Their 
contributions were sought during the UPR drafting process, and new possibilities were 
envisioned for raising national human rights issues at the international level.262  But a 
majority of states perceive the UPR mechanism, foremost, as a consensual, 
inter-governmental process, and they supported proposals to amplify that role, to the 
detriment of other stakeholders.263
 Civil stakeholders, although constrained, have opportunities to affect the UPR 
process.  They closely monitor the proceedings and state participations.  NGOs may 
forward submissions to the OHCHR for its stakeholder summary report, and full texts are 
now posted on the internet, expanding information about conditions in states, 
obligations, violations, compliance and implementation.  NGOs may provide shadow 
reports, help frame questions, and suggest recommendations for states to use or propose.  
A self-evaluation by a group of NGOs of such engagement suggests that some 
governments were willing to take up their concerns.
  These determinations restricting stakeholder 
participation test the obligation to the process interest.  
264
 Stakeholders may, additionally, have a role in implementation of the UPR outcome 
that requires inclusion.
  Such increased reliance on civil 
society helps states fulfills the obligations to ensure participation and reflects substantive 
cooperation. 
265
                                                     
261 Lempinen (2008) p. 26. 
  To the extent the outcome of review emphasizes cooperation 
to promote and protect domestic human rights, civil society should be part of that 
endeavor. 
262 NGO involvement was far greater than in reviews of the former Sub-Commission or 1503 procedure. See 
Sweeney (2009) pp. 205-206. 
263 At an organizational meeting, for example, in May 2008, Pakistan/OIC and Bangladesh sought to limit 
NGOs to the maximum extent possible. See ISHR (2009) p. 46.   
264 Abede (2009) p. 29, fn. 86. 
265 A/HRC/5/1 (2007) para. 31. Abede (2009) pp. 26-27.  
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5.3.3 Efficiency and the Troika 
 The troika is to serve as facilitator of each review.266  Written interrogatories for 
the SUR may be submitted in advance to the troika.  It supervises the minutes and 
recommendations and prepares the WG outcome report, with assistance from the OHCHR 
and coordinated with the SUR.267  Even though one troika member comes from the SUR’s 
geographic region, Abede notes there were concerns it would unduly control and direct 
the abbreviated UPR mechanism, thus denying each state its place, every four years, on 
the world stage.268  Anxiety existed in Africans states that troika rapporteurs would act 
like ad hoc country-specific mandate holders, filtering questions and issues to capture 
recommendations.269
 Predictably, the states limited the troika’s power to engage and help shape the 
UPR.  It may not assess or evaluate matters raised by the states or the situation of human 
rights in the SUR.
 
270  Dignity proponents would argue, however, that such assessment and 
evaluation is precisely what the troika should be doing to facilitate long term 
improvement and success to the UPR.  For the sake of the process and efficiency, 
investment in the troika seems a practical, common sense matter to deal with issues of 
participation, repetition and duplication of questions and issues, and formulation of 
specific, mutually agreed recommendations.  Unless states want something else.  
According to one NGO, as the Troika had no role [in the WG], the summary of 
stakeholders' information and the compilation of UN information prepared by the OHCHR 
receive scant attention, though these documents, more than the SUR reports, reflected 
the realities on the ground.271
                                                     
266 A/HRC/5/1 (2007) para. 18(d). 
 
267 Ibid. Also Rathgeber (2008) p. 2. 
268 Abede (2009) p. 14. 
269 Ibid. 
270 See A/HRC/OM/L.1 (28 February 2008). 
271 Déjà vu at the UPR (2008) p. 1. 
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 Issues over the troika remain unsettled.  With rare exception, only a small number 
of exclusively Western states submitted written questions.272  Less than half the SURs 
allocated time for questions from the troika, and just a few responded directly to them.273  
Sweeney illustrates the case of Ireland, which switched from written questions in the first 
session without taking the floor, to taking the floor in the second session.274
 Quality of recommendations is also problematic in the UPR.  When too broad, 
vague, or weak, implementation can be more difficult.
  Most states 
may prefer oral remarks in the chamber and the public via webcast.  Transparency is 
served, but at a cost.  As indicated, when the list of speakers grows, individual time to 
speak shrinks, and a less realistic outcomes may result.  Consolidated written questions, 
clearly sourced, would likely leave more time for supplemental dialogue and 
recommendations.  Perhaps the UPR and SURs can encourage this by addressing troika 
matters first.  The troika, also, could obviate instances where important questions and/or 
recommendations are left unanswered, intentionally or otherwise. 
275
 Generally, utilization of the troika as indicated satisfies the duty to process under 
the Charter and UN resolutions.  What originally was conceptualized as a system of 
independent rapporteurs
  Recommendations can also 
exceed the basis of review for the UPR or conflict with those from treaty bodies or special 
procedures.  The troika could streamline and tighten recommendations to remove 
deficiencies and thereby assist in HRC adoption of  feasible outcomes. 
276 has essentially been reduced to a rubber stamp of the WG 
review and outcome report.277
                                                     
272 Like Russia in Ukraine’s 2008 review. See Brett (2008) p. 12. 
  Without an effective troika as a buffer to keep matters on 
the task of human rights, risks of politicization at the UPR may grow to prevent the UPR 
from reaching its potential. 
273 ISHR (2009) p. 39.   
274 Sweeney (2009) p. 210. 
275 ISHR (2009) p. 41. 
276 See Sweeney (2009) fn. 31. 
277 A/HRC/5/1 (2007) para. 4(a). 
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5.3.4 Complementarity and Relations with Treaty Bodies and Special Procedures 
 The relationship that develops between the UPR, treaty bodies and special 
procedures will be significant for human rights.  Resolution 32/130, as discussed, requires 
UN bodies to work together to benefit the common goal of human rights, even if 
particular purposes may collide.  Treaties bodies have expressed anxiety that the UPR will 
undermine the treaty body system and erode its autonomy.278
 On the other hand, some have suggested great scope for complementarity.  There 
is a common objective to further country compliance at the domestic level and, while 
remaining mindful of the specific mandates given to treaty bodies under the relevant 
treaties, specific strengths from the mechanisms could be used as a form of follow-up to 
the others.
  There is general concern 
that rejection by states of UPR recommendations may overlap and adversely affect 
treaties and special procedures.  Politics and selectivity are a reality, and can be evidenced 
in UPR recommendations that are vague, conflict with treaty recommendations, or lack 
follow-up. 
279
 Complementarity occurs indirectly when states use the UPR occasion to declare, 
inter alia, intention to ratify outstanding treaties or submit overdue treaty reports.
  Potential exists for a reinforcing relationship, including participation from 
stakeholders, with increased cross-referencing of UPR recommendations in submissions 
to treaty bodies, and vice versa. 
280  
Also, there are frequent references to treaty bodies and special procedures in the WG, 
and multiple and repetitive calls for ratifications, reservation withdrawals, and 
implementation of recommendations.281
                                                     
278 See Sweeney (2009) p. 214, fn. 54. 
  Some treaty body rapporteurs have started to 
279 See A/HRC/12/G/1 (2009) p. 2.  
280 Pakistan ratified the ICCPR and ICESCR just before its UPR.  ISHR (2008) p. 43. 
281 See Sweeney (2009) pp. 213-214.  
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use UPR reports to prepare for examinations of states.282  However, it is suggested there 
is vast room for improvement.283
 To prevent duplication or undermining of treaty bodies or other human rights 
mechanisms, some experts have discussed whether the UPR should serve strictly as an 
implementation oriented mechanism, based on “objective and reliable information” of 
fulfilment by each state of its human rights obligations and commitments.”
 
284  In such 
case, the basis would be binding human rights obligations from ratified treaties and 
customary international law, as interpreted by treaty and expert mechanisms, specifically 
concerning the SUR or in other contexts, such as through established case law.285  The 
main function of the HRC would be to provide oversight for non-conditional 
implementation of findings by independent expert mechanisms, and the UPR to exert 
political pressure on states to promptly implement their human rights obligations.286
 It must be remembered that when looking at complementarity during this early 
stage of the UPR that acceptance, implementation and follow-up of UPR 
recommendations are not foregone conclusions.  None are required.  North Korea, for 
example, rejected 50 recommendations at the draft outcome stage.
  
287
                                                     
282 See Sweeney (2009) p. 214, fn. 53.  
  As a consequence, 
this seems reason alone to safeguard obligatory treaty standards that states voluntarily 
accept, or the roles of special procedures rapporteurs, from vagueries and whims of a 
political UPR process, and particularly from abusive tactics used to weaken them. 
283 Ibid. ISHR (2010) p. 41. 
284 See Lempinen (2008) pp. 15-17. 
285 Ibid. 
286 Ibid. 
287 ISHR (2010) p. 36. 
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6 IMPRESSIONS ON IMPROVEMENT 
 Time will provide the most authoritative assessment of the UPR, if it gives added 
value and improves human rights on the ground, or serves overall to detract from efforts 
in human rights, particularly by treaty bodies and special procedures.  Most likely it will 
fall in between.  This thesis endeavored to see the UPR as it presently exists in hope to 
better understand what it can be.  So much depends on what the states decide, pushed by 
stakeholders and others, not the mechanism itself. 
 Resolution 5/1 allows for a strong, purposeful UPR mechanism, but success in the 
intergovernmental venue may be seen more in terms of the political element and 
differing world views.  Issues persist over the basis of review, the scope of state 
obligations and scrutiny in the process, and qualitative level of participation, among 
others.  Can the UPR create long term balance to better assist states fulfill their 
responsibilities?  Considering the widespread political disagreement between states, is 
this even possible? 
 The UPR mechanism can be a tool to spread the culture of human rights, a catalyst 
to improve a state’s domestic policies and performance.  It provides opportunity for a 
public examination of a state’s national reality.  It provides the SUR to explain its situation 
and state positions about the recommendations from others, particularly those rejected.  
It provides stakeholders and civil society a mechanism to build a knowledge base and 
sway public opinion.  Its potential seems unquestionable.  What follows are impressions 
and ideas related to improvement of the UPR, to spread the culture of human rights, 
based on the many interests presented.  Of course, it is far from complete, due to lack of 
space, knowing full well it will evolve, and that new issues and developments are around 
the corner regarding review of the HRC within the UN structure.288
                                                     
288 See Outcome of the Retreat of Algiers (2010). 
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6.1 PERSONAL DIGNITY INTERESTS 
 The dignity interest is at the foundation of human rights in the UN.  To promote it, 
and establish universality, there should be clarity.  For purposes of the UPR, the HRC can 
develop a new, separate norm of obligation based purely on the UN Charter and UDHR.  It 
would be applied in the UPR to all states.  Obligations and scrutiny should not be 
restricted to what is enforceable.  States could also be routinely asked to specify, in the 
SUR report or to written inquiries, those enumerated rights in the UDHR they consider 
binding, and articulate, when asked, about the rights not included.  Clear positions 
reinforce norms and prevent misunderstandings, unnecessary confrontation, and waste of 
time. 
 The supplement the foregoing, the UPR could determine a standard to ascertain 
when state acts assume binding effect, with presumption in favor of dignity.  When an 
undertaking from state action creates reasonable expectation of compliance, a state could 
be more strictly held to the commitments and pronouncements, such domestic law or 
promises for election to the HRC, as a principle of law and equity, good faith and 
cooperation.  If a state’s own law does not evidence opinio juris and state practice, can 
anything?  Again, ability to enforce is would not the determinant.     
 In the end, applying the preceding ideas could result in formulation of a core 
obligation and a more uniform, balanced process for each review.  As discussed, some 
states289 believe it proper to reject or propose recommendations, even some that 
reiterate existing treaty obligations, that based on divergent views of “internationally 
recognized” human rights standards, or on account or domestic law.290
 The highly condensed UPR process, to the extent possible, can be simplified.  
Focus can be streamlined, for example, to examine how each SUR respects, protects, and 
  A core obligation 
could help bridge the gaps and result in more feasible, implementable recommendations 
and outcomes. 
                                                     
289 Egypt, Bangladesh, Iran. See ISHR (2010) p. 35-36. 
290 A party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for failure to perform a treaty, 
according to Article 27 of the VCLT. 
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fulfills its human rights obligations, substantively and administratively, locally and 
transnationally.  A large component could involve the challenges to state compliance, 
addressed without shame or stigma, including the community responsibilities of all states 
to assist implementation with technical support and capacity building. 
 The typology, as a framework for evaluation of SUR performance, with primary 
emphasis on dignity and community obligations, could bring a more uniform UPR 
procedure, and more realistic recommendations, commitments, and outcomes.  It would 
guide state behavior in the UPR process, where the world watches all the participants.  In 
sum, if all concerned address issues from a similar plane, areas for dialogue increase and 
the community interest built around cooperation is complemented. 
6.2 STATES’ COMMUNITY INTERESTS 
 According to the Human Rights Committee, taking interest in a state’s discharge of 
obligations is a reflection of legitimate community interest, not unfriendly in its nature.291
 Community obligations now extend to people outside state jurisdiction and the 
global community as a whole, to violations that offend human dignity and have 
transnational character, understanding the ramifications.  Threats to international peace 
and security are the textbook example.  States in the UPR can use the UN Charter and 
UDHR, particularly Articles 56 and 22, respectively, as foundation for recommendations to 
help establish non-conventional duties regarding community interests, including implied 
  
States can adopt more proactive roles in the UPR to stress interests of common interests 
of all states.  Obligations erga omnes in human rights may originate from violations of 
individual dignity, but community members each have a duty to other states not to 
engage in misconduct and even to prevent it.  Each state has an identical interest it may 
pursue, according to principles of public international law, to protect and further such 
interest. 
                                                     
291 CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (2004) para 2. 
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duties of good faith and cooperation owed to states, persons and the international 
community. 
 Community obligations may arise using either a traditional, customary law, 
practice approach or the more recent human dignity, conduct approach that sees 
noncompliance as a breach of conduct, not repudiation of state practice.  In either case, 
when there is detrimental reliance, such as for commitments or pledges for election to 
the HRC, then UPR recommendations, outcome, and follow-up could address the wrong, 
fashioned as a remedy or to deter violative conduct and prevent impunity resulting from 
repudiation of actual and implied promises to oblige. 
 Wide scrutiny ought be the norm at the UPR.  However, as seen in Section 5.2.1, 
procedural cooperation required by Resolution 60/251 can be used to stifle debate and 
hinder substantive cooperation required under the Charter.  In the UPR, specifically, to 
obtain SUR consent may result in a narrowed scope of inquiry and may limit the reach of 
recommendations.  Conclusory statements that tend to cut off discussion and 
dissemination, or convey disputed characterizations, should be promptly and consistently 
addressed for the record.  Thus, if a state complains about confrontation over methods, or 
that the subject matter of recommendations interfere with domestic law or sensibilities, 
or inaccurately describes a bilateral dispute, it should have the burden to articulate, 
especially upon request, a more full explanation, with appropriate rights to reply when 
necessary. 
 Finally, states should act with purpose in their duties to assist the UPR process and 
implementation.  The UPR places a huge strain on some less developed states and the 
OHCHR in terms of preparation, translation, and abilities to help the treaty bodies 
perform their duties.292  Participation and implementation of approved UPR 
recommendations involving capacity-building and technical assistance require operational 
UPR Trust Funds.293
                                                     
292 ISHR (2010) p. 41. 
  As suggested, to facilitate participation in the UPR, the Trust Fund 
293 A/HRC/RES/6/17 (2007). 
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could create a joint permanent mission in Geneva for small states to utilize.294
6.3 UPR PROCESS INTERESTS 
  By 
attending to this financial responsibility to cooperate and assist, the developed, more 
wealthy states, many seeking wider intervention and more participation from less 
developed, poorer states often targeted, show goodwill and desire to find solutions.  In 
other words, these are often problems of the whole.  
 The UPR process is designed to produce recommendations for an outcome 
document, then follow-up to realize implementation.  Within the mechanism, states 
decide procedures that affect the outcome.  UPR recommendations are a starting 
reference point for subsequent reviews.  Efforts to improve specificity and feasibility 
therefore seem key.  Recommendations could emphasize matters of conduct, rather than 
result, to help with measuring implementation.  The underutilized troika could help 
consolidate recommendations, to save time and reduce repetition and conflict, with 
states retaining the right to offer recommendations, if necessary.  The Plenary, in the end, 
has the final word on adoption. 
 Recommendations must not, however, conflict with treaty or special procedures 
recommendations, or serve as justification to weaken or usurp treaty bodies or special 
procedures rapporteurs.  Though relationships between the mechanisms remain to be 
seen, complementarity provides opportunity to reinforce implementation of UPR 
recommendations, and vice versa, with some degree of coordination.  The UPR has a 
wider jurisdiction, including matters such as voluntary pledges and commitments falling 
outside of treaties, and could determine which constitute binding obligations.  
Subsequent reviews can monitor implementation of these obligations and accepted 
recommendations, looking to recent national and international human rights 
developments and the effects on the SUR’s overall needs and performance.295
                                                     
294 Outcome of the Retreat of Algiers (2010) p. 20. 
 
295 These can also be addressed under Item 6 of the HRC agenda, an aspect of the UPR not examined due to 
space restrictions.  
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 States can lead by example in the UPR process by utilizing best practices.  For 
example, they could increase input from civil society experts, on national delegations, 
such as Finland, or even the troika,296 illustrating a stark contrast to those using 
politicians.297  They can promote efficiency by enhancing the troika as an effective 
facilitator regarding questions, recommendations, and outcome.298  Perhaps troika 
questions should come first.  After the review itself, states can timely report on 
implementation, to the HRC and on the internet, of experiences, advances and challenges, 
such as Colombia’s recent effort.299  Follow-up in the UPR on approved recommendations 
could be guided by best practices of monitoring adopted by other international 
organizations, such as the IMF, WTO or other peer review mechanisms.300  Finally, states 
can promptly meet financial commitments to the HRC and UPR Trust Funds.  These are 
just a few of many examples.301
 States can affirmatively act in the UPR mechanism to enhance substantive 
cooperation as the norm, in good faith.  Joint and several aims are usually not 
accomplished without it.  Claims relying on the shield of scrutiny supplied by Article 2.7 
procedural cooperation could have a corresponding burden to fully articulate the basis on 
the record, to show good faith and share understanding, while deterring abuse.  
Selectivity, such as bloc voting and back slapping to protect states from scrutiny over 
dignity interests, should be disfavored, and participatory efforts assertively undertaken to 
include both less developed states and, on the domestic level, civil societies.  
Transparency can be encouraged and pursued, consistently and steadfastly, and zealously 
safeguarded.  It counteracts the conflict of interest inherent in states policing themselves 
and creates direct and indirect opportunities for greater participation, public knowledge 
and awareness necessary to further push states in the direction of human rights.  
 
                                                     
296 See Redondo (2008) pp. 727, 729. 
297 This may become a backdoor route to expand expert  involvement.  See Abraham (2007) p. 39. 
298 Outcome of the Retreat of Algiers (2010) p. 19. 
299 10 May 2010 <http://www.vicepresidencia.gov.co/Es/Documents/EPU%20ENG.pdf>. 
300 Outcome of the Retreat of Algiers (2010) p. 23. 
301 Id., pp. 14-15. 
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 States can increase participation of states.  Attendees at the Retreat at Algiers in 
February, 2010 agreed the UPR presented inadequate time for real dialogue with the SUR, 
questions and recommendations.302
 States can increase non-state participation.  Inclusion of stakeholders ensures 
other voices enter the process and furthers the integrity and overall legitimacy of the 
UPR.  The SUR’s national effort to prepare can utilize experts and civil society to help the 
develop realistic, accurate and complete national reports and action plans.  The UPR could 
require details from the UPR of stakeholder participation at each stage through 
implementation.  Member and observer states could also use experts to become more 
effective participants in the UPR, to formulate questions and/or propose 
recommendations that more effectively promote dignity and community interests.  States 
can also advocate less restriction on NGO “general comments” in the Plenary and seek 
expert guidance to assess or measure implementation of approved recommendations for 
follow-up. 
  Again, the troika could help alleviate this situation by 
coordination of questions for efficiency and recommendations for compliance with the 
UPR basis of the review, thus allowing more interactive dialogue.  Greater state 
participation can lead to more and better quality recommendations, especially in low 
profile reviews where they may be needed most.  The UPR Trust Funds can assist states to 
equalize participation and better fulfill the purpose of universality at the UPR.  
Participation includes cooperation in helping states build their capacity, particularly with 
regard to recommendations accepted by the SUR that give rise to other multilateral duties 
owed to global community interests. 
 At present, the UPR process appears ill-equipped as a determinative or compliance 
mechanism, but more like a vessel to collect, evaluate and disseminate information for 
consumption by states and the international community.  Achievement of its purpose, to 
improve human rights on the ground, will likely depend on matters like establishing 
effective participation for all states and non-state rights holders, operating with greater 
                                                     
302 Id., p. 19.  
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transparency and use of the internet, and adopting best practices designed to strengthen 
personal dignity and community rights and interests in balance with the domestic and 
international concerns of sovereign states. 
7 CONCLUSION 
 Asbjørn Eide writes that human rights are unlikely ever to be completely 
transformed into positive law, nor should they be, but must forever remain a source of 
pressure on authorities and inspiration to those who want a better social and 
international order, and thereby to humanize social and international relations.303
 At this point, as its 8
  The 
UPR is a focal point of such pressure and inspiration. 
th session has concluded, it is unclear what it will become of 
the UPR mechanism.  It is intended to determine “fulfilment by each State of its human 
rights obligations and commitments.”304
 In the space available, the thesis examined immediate and and controversial issues 
concerning the UPR process, in relation to categories of interests coming from state 
responsibilities in human rights law.  It provided impressions about means by which state 
obligations can be a source of pressure to influence state conduct in the UPR and the 
direction it can take toward greater balance, inclusion, realism, and legitimacy.  States are 
  Needless to say, there is great latitude to make 
such determination.  Tension between rights of persons and states in the international 
legal-political system is ever present.  States have wide discretion how to approach the 
UPR process, and how it will fare, just as with human rights in general.  This thesis thus 
looked at the UPR mechanism and state obligations related to it, in the context of the 
evolution of human rights at the UN, to grasp at understanding and provide a share of 
pressure and inspiration. 
                                                     
303 Eide (2007) p. 157. 
304 A/RES/ 60/251 (2006) para. 5(e). 
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not just obliged in the UPR to individual, community and process interests, but such 
compliance and its consequences, it is believed, seem well suited to improve human rights 
on the ground.   
 Politics is never far removed, if ever, when states engage each other.  Some 
individual states, or groups of states, will use means available to shield scrutiny into 
internal affairs during the few hours of a UPR, cherishing the once refulted principle of 
Article 2.7 to deny individuals autonomy over their own internal affairs.  Other states will 
strive for a more open, transparent and participatory process, partly in belief that 
inclusion and information are requisites to overcome the apparent conflict of interest of 
policing themselves, to build integrity and legitimacy of process, to reach realistic and 
consistent outcomes when reviewing performance of states, and to create added value. 
 In its development to date, the UPR seems a tool of diplomacy, too deferential and 
protective of states’ sovereign rights, generally, to allow dignity or community rights to 
find equilibrium in the review, scrutiny and follow-up.  Restrictions on UPR participation 
by human rights experts and stakeholders illustrate.  Phillip Alston had suggested a major 
role for the OHCHR and designated experts, to help formulate a concise, focused set of 
recommendations, based on a thorough study of the situation, but with final decision 
power firmly resting in the hands of the HRC members.305  He said:  “It is the responsibility 
accorded to expert inputs that will primarily distinguish the Council’s more objective and 
systematic approach from the haphazard and unscientific country-focused discussions 
held by the Commission.”306
 Without substantive cooperation, binding and feasible recommendations, or 
follow-up and/or enforcement procedures, the UPR process may appear to observers as a 
political theater by states to create an illusion of concern for human rights, while not 
doing much of anything.  Indeed, that may be what was intended.  How far will states 
  Yet states stick to a structure that easily produces 
politicization, apparently unready and unwilling to cede a degree of control. 
                                                     
305 Alston (2006) p. 214. 
306 Ibid. 
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actually go to scrutinize and criticize each other, especially allies, lest they be scrutinized 
themselves?  Sri Lanka, an intial test of how the UPR would address a concurrent serious 
human rights situation, received more positive comments than critical interventions.307
 As an evolving intergovernmental mechanism, states have ability to bring change.  
Adopting best practices and lessons learned, grounded in Article 1.3 and Resolution 
32/130, can help shift norms and prompt states to review modailities, orientations and 
practices.
  
Other reviews, as indicated, have been long on praise, perhaps even to limit legitimate 
discourse.  No matter the intentions, lack of balance in the UPR process can threaten its 
work and relevancy. 
308  The troika, for example, could become as envisioned, a facilitator rather than 
just organizer, assisting efficiency in the WG and the quality of recommendations in the 
outcome report.  Greater use of experts has been mentioned, which should correspond 
with less politicization.  And there must be increased cooperation, substantively, that 
includes provision of economic help for developing states to participate and implement 
the UPR outcome, not as perceived targets of selective oversight, but as bona fide 
participants.309
 The UPR produces indirect benefits to dignity and community interests, some of 
which are beyond ability of states to control, that may have a profound long term impact.  
As a hub of attention, formal and informal records are created for each evaluation.  
Transparency, from webcasting proceedings to disseminating information over the 
internet, from a myriad of sources, can alter the zeitgeist and hasten demands for change.  
Absent consensus, inclusion of all recommendations, even those rejected, in the outcome 
document may open avenues to further investigation, scrutiny and follow-up.  There is a 
cumulative effect that may bring states to believe interventions are not only necessary, 
 
                                                     
307 ISHR (2009) p. 41. 
308 Footnote A of Resolution 5/1 indicates the HRC, after conclusion of the first review cycle, may review the 
UPR, an “evolving process.” Also Brett (2007) p. 7. 
309 See Abede (2009) p. 3. 
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but appropriate.  Consequently, the UPR effect may help states do what they otherwise 
would not do themselves. 
 At the first meeting of the CHR, Henri Laugier of the Secretariat stated, “It should 
be remembered, moreover, that out of these [General Assembly] debates [creating the 
CHR], the general impression had arisen that no violation of human rights should be 
covered up by the principle of national sovereignty, and that violations of the Charter in 
one State constituted a threat to all, and should set in motion the defense mechanisms of 
the international community.”310  Unfortunately, the CHR failed.  In 2008, the ILA’s 
Committee on International Human Rights Law and Practice pondered the increasing role 
of the individual and other non-state actors on the substance of international law, 
sometimes referred to as the “humanization” of international law, and asked:  “Is 
international law changing from a state-centered system based on bilateral obligations 
towards a normative system reflecting the interests and values of a wider range of actors 
and of the international community?”311
 Many states embraced the idea of a review mechanism where human rights 
performance would be evaluated in an objective, universal, genuine and non-selective 
manner.  Abraham believes that long term success in the UPR depends on whether it will 
move from cooperation to criticism when required, and censure of when called for.
  This same question may be asked of the UPR, 
too. 
312  If 
such notions are achieveable in a procedural environment where states review 
themselves is another matter altogether.  The UPR, as developed, thus far protects the 
mutual sovereignty interest of all states, even as they clash between themselves in a 
struggle of “civilization vs. toleration.”313
                                                     
310 E/CN.4/SR.l* (28 January 1947) p. 2. 
  Intergovernmental, non-confrontational, 
without effective accountability, the UPR is open to abuse.  Politics, not law, limits its 
ability to fully scrutinize and monitor alleged violations of human rights in states.  Among 
311 ILA Report (2008) p. 66. 
312 Abraham (2007) p. 37. 
313 See Scheipers (2007) pp. 219–242. 
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the greatest concerns, as the UPR evolves, is to build more trust between states so 
scrutiny is not seen as negative on its face.  It will take years, however, before the UPR can 
realistically be judged as an institution that fulfilled its promise. 
 65 
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